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94 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2016)

DEATH AND PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE*
NATALIE M. BANTA**
Americans store an overwhelming amount of sensitive, personal
information online. In email accounts, social networking posts,
blogs, shared pictures, and private documents, individuals store
(perhaps unwittingly) the secrets and details of their lives in an
unprecedented manner. During an individual’s life, these
accounts are seemingly under the direct control of an account
holder. Privacy is occasionally threatened, but people continue to
use online services and pour personal information into their
online accounts.
When developers created these online services and platforms, it is
unlikely that they gave much thought to what would happen to
accounts when an account holder died. Yet, the treatment of these
accounts after an account holder’s death is an increasingly
pressing issue in today’s society as more and more Americans die
with active, password-protected accounts in their name. In
determining how these assets will be handled at an individual’s
death, powerful principles collide—including privacy, contract,
property, and freedom of information.
This Article discusses how privacy interests are traditionally
terminated at death and explores how they should be revived and
reshaped in a digital future. It argues that to align posthumous
privacy interests with the needs of a digital future, the law must
ensure that succession principles apply to privacy as well as
property rights, and that decedents’ individual intent for the fate
of digital assets is honored. The Article acknowledges that
private contracts may be a sufficient tool to protect privacy after
death in some instances, but argues that the lodestar in any
discussion of posthumous privacy should be testamentary intent.
In the absence of testamentary intent, state legislatures should
enact default rules of digital asset succession that accord with the
family-centered paradigm of inheritance.

* © 2016 Natalie M. Banta.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
Dying is a legally significant act. Death terminates marriages,
terminates some contractual obligations, and initiates property
transfers. A dead person cannot vote, run for office, marry, speak,
enter contracts, or enforce any rights or privileges. A dead person’s
wishes respecting her property, however, are honored by succession
law and American courts to an extraordinary degree. The question
remains whether a person retains any control over her privacy
interests after death.
The right to privacy for the living is one of the most contested
rights in our nation, and the existence of privacy interests after death
is still more muddled. The digital age prompts even more questions
regarding privacy interests. Never has more information about our
lives been produced and stored. In the past two years, we have
accumulated more data than all prior human civilization.1
Furthermore, our capacity to store data is growing at an exponential

1. Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at
30, http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal [http://perma.cc/4YPD5ZHS (staff uploaded archive)] (“The data flow so fast that the total accumulation of the
past two years—a zettabyte—dwarfs the prior record of human civilization.”).
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rate.2 We have developed new ways to analyze this immense quantity
of data by linking databases and improving algorithms.3
With this dramatic increase of personal data collection, scholars
have begun to debate what must be done to ensure that this
staggering quantity of data does not interfere with privacy interests
during our lives.4 In fact, an entirely new field of law has sprung up to
address concerns about informational privacy during life.5 Public
surveys reveal that the majority of Internet users do not believe the
law offers adequate safeguards to keep their online activity private.6
Little thought or attention has been given to what happens to our
privacy interests in our digital assets at death. This is particularly
concerning because postmortem privacy may be just as important as
privacy during life. Furthermore, the ability of individuals to control
the dissemination of information about themselves after death
accords with the testamentary principles we traditionally value.
“Digital assets” has a broad definition. For purposes of this
Article, I use the term to refer to Internet accounts or services that
2. Id. (claiming that computing power doubles every eighteen months, while storage
and computational capacity similarly experience “exponential growth”).
3. See id. (discussing how algorithms and new ways of linking datasets generate more
efficiency and create new insights).
4. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW (2003) (describing the history and development of information privacy law); Clark
D. Asay, Consumer Information Privacy and the Problem(s) of Third-Party Disclosures, 11
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 321 (2013) (identifying certain harms that result in thirdparty disclosures); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193 (1998) (discussing the commercial exploitation of private information and
proposing a statute to combat such invasions of privacy); Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and
Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000) (analyzing the market for
personal data and various models available to provide a remedy for the invasion of data
privacy); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999) (highlighting the vastness of
private information made public and the failure of consumers to opt out); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007 (2010) (encouraging a
unitary tort for invasion of privacy that reflects the social welfare implications of the
defendant’s conduct).
5. See, e.g., Course Information: Information Privacy Law, VAND. L. SCH., http://law
.vanderbilt.edu/courses/334 [http://perma.cc/AC5A-7L8Y]; Fordham CLIP (Center on
Law and Information Policy), FORDHAM U. SCH. OF L., http://www.fordham.edu/info
/20686/fordham_clip [http://perma.cc/F8KV-2D6Q]; Information Privacy Law, GEO. U. L.
CTR., https://epic.org/misc/gulc/ [https://perma.cc/4WK7-7RK7]; Information Privacy Law,
STAN. L. SCH. (Nov. 6, 2015, 1:17 PM), https://www.law.stanford.edu/courses/informationprivacy-law [https://perma.cc/2GPE-489V].
6. Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept.
5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/
[http://perma.cc/Z5PQ-YGZD] (“86% of internet users have taken steps online to remove
or mask their digital footprints. . . . 68% of internet users believe current laws are not good
enough in protecting people’s privacy online . . . .”).
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may hold sensitive, personal information at death such as email, social
networking, pictures, blogs, and document storage sites. Digital
privacy after death is an area of increasing concern because digital
accounts store immense amounts of information about our lives—
often, information that is deeply personal and perhaps not meant for
public consumption at death.7 This information is stored on thirdparty servers that an individual user can access through a passwordprotected site and is not under the direct and constant control of the
account holder. When an individual dies, she leaves such passwordprotected sites full of personal information. Recognizing this fact,
state legislatures, courts, and scholars are beginning to consider
whether such assets are inheritable. So far, eight states have already
passed legislation giving fiduciaries access to a decedent’s digital
accounts after death.8 In addition, several states are considering
similar legislation.9 Meanwhile, many Internet companies are
challenging such legislation, allegedly concerned that digital asset
inheritance could negatively affect user privacy concerns.10 With the
advent and proliferation of digital asset accounts, the scope of privacy
interests after death needs to be reconsidered.11
This Article explores how to reshape privacy interests in digital
assets in a way that is legally and democratically sound. Part I
explores posthumous privacy interests in general, explaining how

7. Anecdotally, we all may be able to think of an email in our inboxes right now that
we would not want to be made public at our deaths.
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. &
June Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 194,
2016); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-715(28) (LEXIS though 2015 Reg. & First Extraordinary
Sess.); IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 143.188 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. Sess.); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3
(LEXIS through chs. 1 & 2, Jan. 2016 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2012 & Supp.
2015).
9. Rachel Emma Silverman, When You Die, Who Can Read Your Email?, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 1, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/when-you-die-who-can-read-youremail-1422849600?mod=e2fb [https://perma.cc/WEZ9-5XX2] (listing Florida, Indiana,
Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Virginia, and Washington).
10. Id. (discussing some Internet firms’ opposition to a Delaware law allowing
executors to access digital media after the account holder dies).
11. Over eighty-five percent of American adults use the Internet in some way.
Kathryn Zickuhr, Who’s Not Online and Why, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www
.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Non-internet-users.aspx [https://perma.cc/KP3X-Y5ZU].
Almost ninety-five percent of teenagers access the Internet regularly. Internet User
Demographics, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/teens/internet-user
-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/HE4L-3J6Y]. These numbers demonstrate that the vast
majority of Americans, young and old, are creating digital assets and leaving a trail of
personal information online.
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common law, constitutional and statutory law, and our testamentary
structures do not attempt to protect a decedent’s privacy interests.
This Part further explores the theoretical underpinnings that justify
the law’s approach to posthumous privacy.
Part II applies the justifications for privacy protections identified
in Part I to digital assets, arguing that posthumous privacy must be
reshaped in order to accommodate a future where digital assets
become even more prevalent. Part II argues that posthumous privacy
depends on control, and the best way to reshape privacy interests is to
treat them as a key part of estate planning procedures. The law
protects decedents’ interests in significant ways, primarily through the
American succession system, which strives to effect a decedent’s
desires concerning his property and remains—in fact, his interests
often override the interests of a living person who may want to do
something else with the property.12 In light of the advent and
proliferation of vast quantities of digital assets, Part II argues that
succession principles should also be used to protect personal secrets
and privacy interests after death. Part II also explores the use of
private contracts to protect posthumous privacy and argues that
private contracts have gone too far in protecting digital asset privacy
by ignoring individual, testamentary intent. This Part concludes that
any default rules regarding termination of accounts at death should
be legislatively determined in a democratic system.
Part III explores how digital asset accounts should be treated if
an individual has not made her intent known. Succession principles
should apply, and living family members should have a claim in
controlling or accessing a decedent’s digital assets. This Part examines
legal doctrines that protect or favor family interests after an
individual has died, namely the doctrines of “familial privacy,”
publicity, and copyright. Part III concludes by supporting Part II’s
advocacy for legislation that would establish a default rule allowing a
decedent’s surviving family members to protect the decedent’s digital
accounts from being controlled by third parties or publicly
disseminated.
The law of privacy and succession must be equipped for our
impending digital future.13 Ultimately, this Article concludes that
12. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
1–4 (9th ed. 2013).
13. Most Americans already keep vast amounts of private information,
correspondence, and pictures in digital accounts stored on third-party servers. As
mentioned earlier, over eighty-five percent of American adults use the Internet in some
way. Zickuhr, supra note 11.
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digital asset privacy will best be protected by acknowledging the
importance of posthumous privacy in a digital age, honoring
individual choice, and establishing a default rule that accords with a
family-centered paradigm.
I. THE LACK OF POSTHUMOUS PRIVACY
Privacy is a relatively modern legal construct, born out of
concerns about technological developments in the nineteenth
century.14 In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote a
seminal article voicing concerns about the toll of modern life on
privacy.15 They pointed to “instantaneous photographs,” “numerous
mechanical devises,” and the development of the “newspaper
enterprise” as threats to the “sacred precincts of private and domestic
life.”16 These advancements in society threatened the “right to be let
alone,”17 and Warren and Brandeis called on the common law to
protect the right to privacy and thereby avoid the “evil[s]” of gossip
and the press.18 Over one hundred years later, the law of privacy is
still developing as technological advancements continue to erode
traditional concepts of privacy.19 Digital assets have produced the

14. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters
in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1128 (2002) (“It is a historical commonplace
that ‘privacy’ is a modern invention. Medieval people had no such concept. . . . Privacy, as
idea and reality, is the creation of modern bourgeois society. It was above all a creation of
the nineteenth century.”).
15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
16. Id. at 195.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 196.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that attaching
a GPS to a suspect’s vehicle and then monitoring the vehicle’s location constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001)
(holding that the warrantless use of heat sensors on a home was a search subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny); United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 360 (D. Vt. 2013)
(holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in real-time cell phone location
information, which justified police tracking a convicted felon’s cell phone on suspicion of
drug trafficking and murder); United States v. Alabi, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1273–74
(D.N.M. 2013) (holding that scanning a defendant’s magnetic credit and debit card strips
when the cards were already possessed by law enforcement was not a search subject to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as the credit and debit card information was “not a
constitutionally protected area”); DeVittorio v. Hall, 589 F. Supp. 2d 247, 256–57
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that a hidden video camera placed in a police locker room was
not a search because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy), aff’d, 347 F. App’x
650 (2d Cir. 2009); State v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866, 868–69 (Vt. 1998) (holding that a
warrantless video camera activated by a motion sensor and containing video of a suspect
cultivating marijuana in their own yard was not a search under chapter 1, article 11 of the
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greatest amount of private individual information the world has ever
seen,20 and we are still struggling to determine whether and to what
extent the law should protect the privacy of these accounts—both in
life and after death.
Privacy is a loaded term with many different definitions and
methods of enforcement.21 Protecting privacy after death would
require courts to enforce the testamentary intent of an individual
concerning the information stored in her digital accounts after her
death.22 When concerned with privacy interests after death, the most
significant consideration is the degree of posthumous control that
decedents should exert in the name of privacy. Currently, no such
protections are in place. The common law majority view is that a
decedent’s estate may not bring an action to protect the decedent’s
privacy.23 When it comes to an individual’s reputation, constitutional
privacy interest, or information gleaned from her testamentary estate,
the law does not honor a decedent’s interest in controlling the
dissemination of private or false information about herself after her
death. This Part proceeds by analyzing how common law,
constitutional and statutory law, and existing testamentary structures
are inadequate mechanisms to protect posthumous privacy in today’s
digital age.
A. Reputational Privacy
Traditionally, tort law provides one of the main avenues for
controlling private information and protecting one’s reputation
during life. The common law has long recognized that privacy
Vermont Constitution, which offers broader protection to privately owned lands outside
the curtilage of the home than does the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
20. Shaw, supra note 1.
21. See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government:
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455,
458 (1995) (“Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to designate a range of
wildly disparate interests—from confidentiality of personal information to reproductive
autonomy—and connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being
asserted in its name.”).
22. See ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1970);
Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change,
1810–1990, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1174 (1992) (“[T]he ability to enforce the privacy of
any item of information should depend on the intention and conduct of the
individual . . . .”); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is not
simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control
we have over information about ourselves.”).
23. See Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (listing
cases); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (listing cases); infra
Section I.A.
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encompasses the ability of an individual to control information about
himself,24 and tort law attempts to secure that right of privacy by
punishing those who intrude into another’s life. It does so using a
variety of causes of action. Although some torts offer minimal privacy
protection,25 none of these claims can be brought on behalf of a
decedent’s estate. This Section analyzes how tort law fails to protect
posthumous privacy.
1. Posthumous Privacy Torts
Although privacy concerns can be traced back to Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article, privacy torts did not gain traction
until William Prosser categorized the “right to privacy” into four
distinct torts, thereby creating a workable framework for courts and
legislatures to implement.26 Prosser suggested the following four
torts,27 later accepted into the Restatement (Second) of Torts: (1)
intrusion upon a plaintiff’s solitude or into his private affairs,28 (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts,29 (3) information that
places a plaintiff in a false light in the public eye,30 and (4)
appropriation of a plaintiff’s name or likeness.31 These torts protect
an individual’s power to control information about herself and her
ability to limit others in disclosing information in the public domain.32

24. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989) (“[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass
the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person. In an organized
society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another divulged to another. Thus
the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the
degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of
time rendered it private.”).
25. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (describing
four privacy torts).
26. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1888 (2010) (noting that Prosser’s division of privacy law into four
distinct torts made him the “law’s chief architect”).
27. Prosser, supra note 25, at 389.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
29. § 652D.
30. § 652E.
31. § 652C.
32. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989)
(“[T]he concept of privacy is employed to govern the conduct of other individuals who
intrude in various ways upon one’s life. Privacy in these contexts can be generally
understood in its familiar informational sense; it limits the ability of others to gain,
disseminate, or use information about oneself.”).
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State courts began to recognize tort causes of action for the
invasion of the right of privacy at the turn of the century.33 Their
impact on protecting privacy during life is debated, with some
scholars arguing that torts have been ineffective at remedying
invasions of privacy.34 No matter their degree of effectiveness, privacy
torts are generally available to protect privacy during life;35 however,
the majority of courts do not allow this right to extend beyond
death.36
Courts have based their refusal to extend privacy rights beyond
death on the common law notion that personal rights die with the

33. See, e.g., Reed v. Real Detective Publ’g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 137–38 (Ariz. 1945);
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins.
Co., 50 S.E. 68, 72 (Ga. 1905) (“The liberty of privacy exists, has been recognized by the
law, and is entitled to continual recognition.”); De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 148–49
(Mich. 1881) (recognizing the plaintiff’s right to privacy); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W.
1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891)
(recognizing the “gradual extension” of the right to privacy as a means of redressing
injuries to individual rights).
34. See Friedman, supra note 14, at 1125 (“In hindsight, it looks as if the Warren and
Brandeis idea of privacy . . . never got much past the starting post; and is now effectively
dead.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1204 (2004) (asserting that “it is generally conceded that [the privacy
torts conceptualized by Warren and Brandeis] amount[] to little in American practice
today”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362 (1983) (arguing that one common
law privacy tort did not “become a usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs”).
35. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS §§ 2:1, 3:1, 4:1 (2015); see, e.g., Minnifield v.
Ashcraft, 903 So. 2d 818, 820, 827 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (noting that a tattoo company
invaded the privacy of a client by submitting a photo of her upper breast in a national
tattoo magazine without her consent); Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 373–74, 379 (Colo.
1997) (upholding an invasion of privacy tort where an associate disclosed allegedly
confidential information that another lawyer was homosexual and needed to have a HIV
test, resulting in his termination); In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa
2008) (holding that a husband’s secret videotaping of his wife in her room constituted an
invasion of privacy); Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051, 1052–53, 1058–59 (Ohio 2007)
(recognizing the false light privacy tort when neighbors distributed a handbill seeking a
reward for information relating to property damage); Staruski v. Cont’l Tel. Co. of Vt., 581
A.2d 266, 273 (Vt. 1990) (holding that an employer running an advertisement with an
employee’s name and photograph without the employee’s consent constituted an invasion
of privacy); cf. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15, 1417–18 (2013) (holding that a
law enforcement dog sniffing the front porch of an alleged marijuana producer was an
invasion of privacy interests, therefore leading to suppression of evidence under the
Fourth Amendment).
36. See Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (listing
cases); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“Further, the right
does not survive but dies with the person.”). There are a few cases where a privacy claim
has survived death, but these are minority decisions. See, e.g., Real Detective Publ’g Co.,
162 P.2d at 139 (allowing a privacy claim as an “injury to the person” to be brought by a
decedent’s administratrix under a state statute).
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person.37 In other words, personal rights (like the right to privacy)
terminate at the time of death.38 Property rights, however, are
different; they are not seen as personal rights that die with a
decedent.39 Rather, a decedent’s estate can enforce property rights on
the decedent’s behalf.40 Following this reasoning, courts conclude that
privacy rights protect a personal right specific to the person whose
privacy was invaded.41
To explain this conclusion, courts reason that a privacy intrusion
is an injury to feelings as well as to one’s own peace of mind and
comfort but does not involve economic damage.42 One court
explained, “Since, under the law, recovery may be had for an invasion
of the right of privacy for injured feelings alone, the wrongs redressed
must be considered as a direct rather than an indirect injury and one
that is wholly personal in character . . . .”43 Thus, the feelings and
mental processes that are protected by the right to privacy make the
right a personal one, which can only be vindicated through a personal
cause of action. In other words, the cause of action for an invasion of
privacy cannot be assigned, inherited, or transferred.44 Other courts
do not attempt to explain why privacy rights are personal in nature or
why personal claims cannot be transferred to an estate.45 Instead,
these courts merely repeat the rule that an estate cannot sue for an
invasion of privacy on behalf of the decedent.46
In practice, cases asserting the invasion of a decedent’s privacy
often arise when news reports or books print information about a
37. Under the common law, personal rights die with the person, but property rights
survive and are handled by a decedent’s executor. See Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550, 553
(1867) (discussing the common law maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona,” that a
personal action “die[s] with the person” while property rights survive).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass’n, 154 F. 911, 913–14
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907); Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 271, 271
(Ct. Com. Pl. 1894); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 1977).
42. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 325 P.2d 659, 661 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
43. Reed v. Real Detective Publ’g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 139 (Ariz. 1945).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. a.
45. See Nelson v. Gass, 21 Pa. D. 777, 778 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1912) (“Where the action is
founded merely on an injury to the person, and no property is in question, it dies with the
person; but where property is concerned, it survives.”).
46. See Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235, 237 (Ala. 1955) (explaining that the
right to privacy “is a purely personal action and does not survive but dies with the
person”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. b (“In the absence of
statute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the
individual whose privacy is invaded.”).
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decedent that offends surviving family members.47 For example, in
Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co.,48 a surviving family member sued a
publisher for stating that her brother, an acclaimed boxing champion,
had ended up as an impoverished “dope-sodden derelict” and that his
“knife-scarred body” had been “fished” from the San Francisco Bay.49
The decedent’s sister argued that this publication was a wrongful
invasion of the general right of privacy.50 The court dismissed her suit,
holding that the right of privacy was a personal one that could not be
asserted by the decedent’s relatives.51 As another example, in
Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co.,52 a family sued a local publishing
company after an article in a newspaper accused their father of
bribing public officials.53 The court again held that a claim of privacy
only extends to one’s own privacy and does not survive the death of
the party whose privacy was invaded.54 Courts and commentators
have made it clear that privacy rights do not survive death.55 In
limited situations, a family can claim an invasion of their privacy
interests to keep information about a decedent private, but no
protection extends to guard the privacy of a decedent herself.56
2. Posthumous Defamation
The law protects an individual’s ability to maintain a good
reputation through the torts of defamation, libel, and slander, but,
like the right to privacy, none of these causes of action are available

47. See Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 146 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(evaluating privacy rights when a news broadcast reported a story that stated murder
victims were in a homosexual relationship); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 146–47
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (determining whether a book claiming that decedent “was a
homosexual and a Nazi spy” offended the privacy rights of surviving relatives).
48. 325 P.2d 659 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
49. Id. at 660.
50. Id. at 661.
51. Id. at 661, 664.
52. 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965).
53. Id. at 776 (construing New Mexico law).
54. Id. at 776–77.
55. See Metter v. L.A. Exam’r, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); Bradley v.
Cowles Magazines, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960) (listing cases supporting its
decision not to extend the right to privacy to a decedent’s surviving relative); 62A AM.
JUR. 2D Privacy § 13 (2005 & Supp. 2015) (“The right of privacy is a purely personal one,
and the plaintiff must show an invasion of his or her own right of privacy before recovery
may be had. The general rule is that even a close relative may not recover for the invasion
of privacy of another. Thus, an action for invasion of privacy may be brought only by the
person who was the actual subject of the invasion of privacy, and not by other persons
such as members of his or her family.”).
56. See infra Section III.A for a discussion of family privacy after death.
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after the rightholder dies.57 There is a direct link between privacy and
reputation: reputation consists of what people think about an
individual, and people’s thoughts about a person derive from what
information they know—or don’t know—about an individual. To
protect his reputation, an individual must pay careful attention to the
information available about him. For those who have secrets that
could destroy their reputation, the ability to control the dissemination
of that information or otherwise preserve privacy is particularly
important.
Defamation and privacy torts are aimed at protecting an
individual’s reputation. During your life, if someone makes “[a] false
written or oral statement that damages [your] reputation,” you can
bring a suit against that person for defamation.58 Once you die,
however, people can say or write what they want without fear of
reprisal because defamation of the dead is not a cause of action
recognized by the common law.59 Although some courts allow
defamation suits to continue if a living person brought suit and
subsequently died, courts do not allow an action for defamation to be
initiated after a person has died.60
The justifications for not allowing a cause of action for
defamation after the death of the defamed person are similar to those
set forth for refusing to extend privacy protections after death. First,
modern tort law aims “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution
for harms,”61 and when a person dies, the law finds no harm that can
be compensated;62 courts reason that a dead person’s reputation can

57. See supra Section I.A.1.
58. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990); Defamation, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
59. Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 79 N.W. 122, 122 (Iowa 1899); Jones v. Matson, 104
P.2d 591, 595 (Wash. 1940) (“At common law the rule is often stated broadly that causes
of action for torts die with the person.”).
60. Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that there is
no “basis for recovery in a civil action” for “the malicious defamation of the memory of
the dead”); Saari v. Gillett Commc’ns of Atlanta, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 736, 737 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) (“[T]hat case merely held that where a living person had brought an action for libel
and then died while the action was pending, the action did not abate but survived to his
representative. It clearly does not follow from this holding that a person can be libeled
after he has died.”).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
62. Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So. 2d 790, 791 (La. 1992) (“Once a person is
dead, there is no extant reputation to injure or for the law to protect. Since the cause of
action is intended to redress injuries flowing from harm to one’s reputation, we conclude
that to be actionable defamatory words must be ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff or,
directly or indirectly, cast a personal reflection on the plaintiff.”).
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no longer be injured.63 Second, even if a court finds that harm has
been done to a deceased person’s reputation, the right to protect
one’s reputation is a personal one and cannot be enforced by a third
party.64 Thus, the personal nature of the defamation tort is one of the
main barriers to recognizing a claim for posthumous defamation.65
Such a claim, even if warranted by blatantly false publications or
statements made about a decedent, is currently unavailable to protect
privacy interests after death. Even though the digital age is raising
questions of posthumous privacy because of the increased amount of
available personal information, tort law is an inadequate solution and
offers no protection for posthumous privacy.
B.

Constitutional and Statutory Privacy

As noted above, the common law does not allow a decedent’s
estate to bring a tort action to protect the decedent’s privacy.
Similarly, cognizable solutions to this problem do not currently exist
in constitutional or statutory law. Neither federal nor state law
adequately recognizes individual privacy protections after death.
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which seeks to
deter unreasonable search and seizure,66 and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—the substantive tool protecting
individual conduct and choices67—offer privacy protection in certain
situations. After death, however, a decedent cannot take advantage of
the privacy protections embedded in the Fourth and Fourteenth

63. Id.
64. Gruschus v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he common
law did not recognize a right to reflect in the reputation of another and the action did not
survive the death of the defamed party.”); Lee v. Weston, 402 N.E.2d 23, 30 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (“Defamatory words are not actionable unless they refer to some ascertained or
ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff.”); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson,
160 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1941).
65. See Gruschus, 342 F.2d at 776.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from
wholly outlawing contraceptives or abortion. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–
86 (1965) (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship. . . . We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
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Amendments. A decedent is not a “person” within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore cannot take advantage of any
privacy protection that the Fourteenth Amendment gives a living
person.68 Recently, an executor filed a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that a medical examiner’s determination that
the decedent took her own life was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the determination of suicide deprived the
decedent of due process of law.69 The court dismissed the claim,
finding that it was “well settled that a deceased person has no
constitutional rights.”70
Similarly, it follows that the Fourth Amendment’s protection
from unreasonable search and seizure is a privacy interest that cannot
be enforced after death. For example, in Hubenschmidt v. Shears,71
plaintiffs in a wrongful death action challenged evidence that was
removed from the bodies of the deceased (blood alcohol tests) as a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.72 The court found the results
could be properly admitted because the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy ended with the death of the person and could not be claimed
by the deceased’s estate.73
Statutory law, like constitutional law, also fails to recognize
personal privacy rights of the dead. Federal courts have found that
when a statute uses the term “person,” it refers to “a living human
being” and does not provide a basis for a posthumous claim for
violation of the statute or right at issue.74 Federal law such as the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and numerous state law
counterparts concerning public records contain privacy protections.75
68. Swickard v. Wayne Cty. Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 312 (Mich. 1991) (holding
that the privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment is personal and cannot be
asserted by a decedent’s estate).
69. Infante v. Dignan, 782 F. Supp. 2d 32, 32, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
70. Id. at 38.
71. 270 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1978).
72. Id. at 3–4.
73. Id. at 4; see also McLean v. Rogers, 300 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)
(“Issues such as search and seizure, [or the] right to privacy . . . which could be raised in
cases dealing with extraction of a blood sample from a living person do not apply.”).
74. See Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding a deceased
person could not bring an action under the Civil Rights Act); see also Whitehurst v.
Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[A decedent] is no longer a person within our
constitutional and statutory framework, and has no rights of which he may be deprived.”).
75. The Freedom of Information Act exempts “personnel and medical files” from
disclosure if the disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012). Similarly, § 552(b)(7)(C) exempts disclosure of
investigative records complied for law enforcement purposes that constitute “an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” § 552(b)(7)(C); see also Daniel J. Solove,
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FOIA protects the ability of “any person” to request records
maintained by an executive agency.76 The law also prevents
government records from being released to the public if those records
“could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy.”77
Because FOIA acknowledges the importance of privacy interests
through these exceptions, it provides only partial protection. Courts
look only to common law privacy protections to determine whether a
FOIA request should be denied under a privacy exception, and thus
FOIA generally does not protect posthumous privacy interests.78 In
National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish,79 a man was
found dead in a park near Washington, D.C.80 During the
investigation of the death, police officers took ten pictures of his
body, to which journalists later requested access under FOIA.81 In
construing FOIA’s privacy exemption, the Supreme Court looked to
the common law concerning privacy at death.82 Rather than finding
that the decedent had a privacy interest in the crime scene photos, the
Court held that the decedent’s family members were the individuals
whose privacy interests in the death scene images were protected by
FOIA.83 Therefore, the Court denied the FOIA request for these
pictures, holding that revealing this information would be an
unwarranted invasion of the family’s personal privacy.84 However, the
Court’s analysis demonstrated that because FOIA protections look to
common law privacy protections, an individual’s personal privacy
interests are not protected under FOIA after his death.85

Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1137, 1160–64 (2002) (discussing federal and state freedom of information laws and their
exemptions relating to privacy).
76. § 552(a)(3)(A).
77. § 552(b)(7)(C).
78. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167 (2004)
(explaining that Congress intended for FOIA to protect “against public intrusions long
deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions”); Ray
Madoff, Dead Right: In America, the Living Aren’t Always in Charge, 21 EXPERIENCE, no.
1, 2011, at 6, 11 (“Although these cases may seem to extend privacy protections to family
members . . . they only limit access to information held by a government.”).
79. 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
80. Id. at 160–61.
81. Id. at 161.
82. Id. at 168.
83. Id. at 167–68.
84. Id. at 171, 175.
85. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (explaining that at common law,
privacy rights were personal rights that were nontransferable and therefore terminated at
death); cf. Favish, 541 U.S. at 169–70 (acknowledging that Congress enacted FOIA in
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Federal law also protects the use and dissemination of personally
identifiable information maintained by federal agencies under the
Privacy Act of 1974 (“Privacy Act”).86 The Privacy Act prohibits
disclosure of identifying information unless the disclosure falls under
a statutory exception.87 Although a decedent’s death is not a statutory
exception allowing the release of information, in 1975 the Office of
Management and Budget published guidelines stating that the Privacy
Act did not contemplate permitting relatives to protect the privacy of
deceased individuals.88 These guidelines are treated deferentially by
federal courts.89 Most recently, the Second Circuit noted that a party
“correctly asserts that deceased individuals generally do not enjoy
rights under the Privacy Act.”90
Another federal law may play a more significant role in privacy
after death, especially as it relates to digital assets. In 1986, Congress
passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) as part of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.91 The SCA governs and
protects the privacy of online communications.92 The SCA
criminalizes “intentional[] access[] without authorization [of] a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided.”93 It
prohibits “a person or entity providing an electronic communication
service to the public” from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or
entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by

consideration of the common law but suggesting that the privacy interest protected under
FOIA extends further).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2014). Section 552a is referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974. See
Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,949 (July 9, 1975).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
88. Id.; Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,951 (July 9, 1975) (“The
[Privacy] Act did not contemplate permitting relatives and other interested parties to
exercise rights granted by the Privacy Act to individuals after the demise of those
individuals.”).
89. See, e.g., Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915, 919 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
Crumpton v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 751, 756 (D.D.C. 1994) (“The releases
complained of are not covered by the Privacy Act because [the individual] is
deceased . . . .”).
90. Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 2014).
91. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2712 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114114, approved Dec. 28, 2015)); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications
Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 & n.1
(2004).
92. Kerr, supra note 91, at 1208 (“The SCA . . . by and large . . . reflects a sound
approach to the protection of stored Internet communications.”).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2014). Fines and imprisonment of up to ten years are
imposed upon those who violate § 2701(a). See § 2701(b).
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that service[,]”94 unless the recipient of the information is an agent95
or the disclosure is made with the customer’s consent.96 Further, the
government may not obtain information from an Internet company
without a warrant or a subpoena.97 If a company violates the SCA, it
could be liable for statutory and punitive damages and attorney’s
fees.98 The SCA has no provision on how information should be
treated after an account holder’s death or whether an estate could
bring a claim under the Act if a company divulged the electronic
communications of a decedent.
The general lack of posthumous privacy protection reflected in
FOIA, the Privacy Act, and SCA extends beyond federal law. Some
states create privacy protections in their constitutions, but these
constitutional provisions remain silent on privacy protections after
death.99 Questions about privacy after death under state law most
often arise when the public wants access to autopsy or crime scene
photographs, video recordings, or other records that show or describe
a deceased individual.100 As with the Supreme Court in Favish, state
courts often hold that disseminating autopsy photos violates the

94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(1).
95. § 2702(b)(1).
96. § 2702(c)(2).
97. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2702(b)(2), 2703(a), 2703(c)(2).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c).
99. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (LEXIS through 2015 First Reg. Sess. and
First and Second Spec. Sess.) (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg.
Sess.) (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 4, 2014) (“Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the
person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess.) (“The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.”).
100. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683, 685–86, 694–95 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that plaintiff family members stated a claim for outrageous
infliction of emotional distress by reckless conduct when police officers publically
disclosed photos and video of an autopsy which were part of a criminal investigation);
Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (holding that family members have a
common law right to privacy in the photographs and autopsy reports of deceased loved
ones); Comaroto v. Pierce Cty. Med. Exam’r’s Office, 43 P.3d 539, 542–44 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002) (denying a convicted child molester access to his victim's suicide note, which was
part of the medical examiner’s report, under state public records law); Clay Calvert, A
Familial Privacy Right over Death Images: Critiquing the Internet-Propelled Emergence of
a Nascent Constitutional Right that Preserves Happy Memories and Emotions, 40
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 475, 500 & n.162 (2013) (describing how Hustler Magazine’s
request for a set of gruesome crime scene photographs spurred change in Georgia’s public
records law).
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surviving family members’ privacy.101 A few states have even passed
legislation to prevent public disclosure of certain death images.102
Although some states provide limited posthumous privacy
protections, examples are sparse; states, in general, have not adopted
comprehensive statutory privacy protections for decedents.
C.

Testamentary Privacy

There is also a lack of privacy protection for decedents’
testamentary documents. The law of wills and intestate succession
ensure that a decedent’s property is distributed according to her
intent after death, but neither wills nor intestacy statutes protect a
decedent’s personal, posthumous privacy interests.
Because probate proceedings are public proceedings, decedents
lose privacy as to the contents and distribution of their estate when
the estate probates a will.103 The contents of a will, documents, or
information that arise during a probate proceeding are public records
open to public inspection.104 Journalists, curious neighbors, or
estranged family members are welcome to examine a decedent’s
will.105 Newspaper articles, books, and websites track the wills of

101. For more discussion of family members’ privacy as related to decedents’ digital
assets, see infra Section III.A.
102. FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 First Reg. & Spec. A
Sess.) (exempting autopsy records from public disclosure); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1627(e)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2015) (preventing autopsy photos from being disclosed if not
under a listed exception); LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:19(B) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (“[P]hotographs, video, or other visual images, in whatever form, of or relating to an
autopsy conducted under the authority of the office of the coroner shall be confidential,
are deemed not to be public records, and shall not be released . . . except as otherwise
provided in this Section.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-389.1(a) (2013 & Supp. 2015)
(“Except as otherwise provided by this section, no custodian of the original recorded
images shall furnish copies of photographs or video or audio recordings of an autopsy to
the public.”).
103. See In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
104. Id. at 823 (“[T]here can be no doubt that court records are public records,
available to the public in general, including news reporters, unless a specific exception
makes specific records non-public. . . . [N]o statute exempts probate files from the status of
public records[.]” (citations omitted)).
105. Id.; Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 166 N.W.2d 546, 547, 549 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1963) (upholding the right of a newspaper corporation to view the will of a
prominent, recently deceased member of the community); GEORGE M. TURNER, 2
REVOCABLE TRUSTS § 64:7.4 (5th ed. 2014) (“By definition, the probate system is
intended to be a public vehicle. The spectacles of people’s lives, finances, and family
relationships as well as nonfamily relationships, are so notorious that they need not be
reviewed.”). A current TV show, The Will: Family Secrets Revealed, is devoted to
uncovering family secrets after death. See The Will: Family Secrets Revealed Gets a
Facelift for Season Three, Featuring Celebrity Stories and Famous Family Feuds,
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celebrities or interesting individuals to give the public more
information about their lives from the property they left at their
passing.106 For example, in In re Estate of Hearst,107 family members
requested that the court seal probate proceedings, claiming that the
proceedings revealed information about their identities and property
that could be used against them by terrorist groups.108 The appellate
court remanded the case to a lower court to determine the risk to the
family, emphasizing that “when individuals employ the public powers
of state courts [such as probate] to accomplish private ends, . . . they
do so in full knowledge of the possibly disadvantageous circumstance
that the documents and records filed in the trust will be open to
public inspection.”109
Because documents filed in a probate proceeding are public,
decedents lose privacy as to the contents of their estate, which could
include the amount of money in accounts, the net value of an estate,
or the specific personal property owned by a decedent. For instance,
when Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis died, her will revealed that her
estate was worth less than widely expected.110 In addition, her will
revealed a detailed list of her personal property, including such items
as a “Greek alabaster head of a woman[,]” Indian miniatures, a copy
of her first husband’s inaugural address signed by Robert Frost,
furniture, jewelry, and clothes.111

DISCOVERY: PRESS WEB, https://press.discovery.com/us/id/press-releases/2012/will-familysecrets-revealed-gets-facelift-se-2056/ [http://perma.cc/W82T-M646].
106. See generally RUSSELL J. FISHKIND, PROBATE WARS OF THE RICH AND
FAMOUS: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING AND PROBATE LITIGATION
(2011) (tracking the estate litigation contests of several celebrities); ANDREW W.
MAYORAS & DANIELLE B. MAYORAS, TRIAL AND HEIRS: FAMOUS FORTUNE FIGHTS!
(2009) (describing stories of inheritance contests of public figures); HERBERT E. NASS,
WILLS OF THE RICH AND FAMOUS (2000) (providing descriptions and excerpts from wills
of public figures); Family Feud Erupts over Heath Ledger’s Will After Daughter Matilda Is
Left Out, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 10, 2008, 3:59 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz
/article-529408/Family-feud-erupts-Heath-Ledgers-daughter-Matilda-left-out.html
[http://perma.cc/4NMJ-QH8F] (revealing details of actor’s will); Famous Wills and Trusts,
TRUETRUST.COM, http://www.truetrust.com/Famous_Wills_and_Trusts/Famous_Wills
_and_Trusts.html [https://perma.cc/373X-NDUE] (providing copies of several last wills of
public figures).
107. 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
108. Id. at 825.
109. Id. at 825–26.
110. David Cay Johnston, Mrs. Onassis’s Estate Worth Less than Estimated, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/21/nyregion/mrs-onassis-s-estate
-worth-less-than-estimated.html [http://perma.cc/8P62-AWUD].
111. Steve Fainaru, Onassis Gave Bulk of Estate to Children, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 31,
2003), http://www.boston.com/news/packages/jfkjr/jackie_will.htm [http://perma.cc/F4UXJLMG].
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In addition to losing privacy as to the content of the estate, when
a will is filed, a decedent also loses the ability to keep private the
identities of the will’s beneficiaries. In Onassis’s example, her will
revealed various gifts to her longtime friends and confidantes, her
maids, her children’s governess, her accountant, her butler, and her
lawyer.112 Furthermore, bequests and devises in a will can reveal
secret relationships. In the case of In re Estate of Kuralt,113 Charles
Kuralt’s holographic will revealed that he had continued a thirty-year
extra-marital affair with a woman named Patricia Elizabeth
Shannon.114 He kept this relationship secret from his wife and from
the public throughout his life.115 When his wife attempted to probate
his property in Montana, she learned that Kuralt had attempted to
give the property to Shannon in a 1989 holographic will and again in a
1997 letter.116 This testamentary devise revealed to the Kuralt family
and the public the extent of Kuralt’s private relationships with
Shannon and her children.117 This demonstrates how a decedent may
not realize the extent of personal information that is conveyed to the
public when her will is probated.
There is, however, a tool to protect one’s privacy as to the
contents of her estate and to whom the estate is distributed—an inter
vivos revocable trust.118 Although revocable trusts and wills serve
almost identical purposes, a trust is accorded privacy after death while
a probated will becomes a matter of public record.119 A trust is a
nonprobate asset, which means that a trustee distributes property

112. Id.
113. In re Estate of Kuralt (Kuralt II), 2000 MT 359, 15 P.3d 931; In re Estate of Kuralt
(Kuralt I), 1999 MT 111, 981 P.2d 771.
114. Kuralt II, 2000 MT at ¶ 6, 15 P.3d at 932; Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶ 2, 981 P.2d at 771.
115. Kuralt II, 2000 MT at ¶ 5, 15 P.3d at 932; Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶ 9, 981 P.2d at 773.
Charles Kuralt was a public figure as host and journalist of a CBS show called “On the
Road.” Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶ 9, 981 P.2d at 772.
116. Kuralt II, 2000 MT at ¶¶ 8, 11, 15 P.3d at 932–33; Kuralt I, 1999 MT at ¶¶ 14, 17,
981 P.2d at 773–74.
117. See Bob Anez, Charles Kuralt’s Secret Life, SALON (June 8, 1999, 12:01 PM),
http://www.salon.com/1999/06/08/kuralt/ [http://perma.cc/UX47-FEGM] (describing the
relationship Kuralt had with Shannon and her children).
118. See TURNER, supra note 105, § 64:7.4 (“[T]he vast majority of Revocable Living
Trusts go through no scrutiny by any individual or organization which would invade the
privacy of the estate or the beneficiaries.”); see also In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr.
821, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that family members “can eschew court-regulated
devices for transmission of inherited wealth and rely on private arrangements such as inter
vivos gifts, joint tenancies, and so-called ‘living’ or grantor trusts”).
119. See Francis H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 566 (2008)
(discussing the strength of “trust privacy”); supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text
(describing how a probated will is generally available for public viewing).
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according to the terms of the trust without court supervision.120
Because a trust instrument is not part of a public record, individuals
who use a trust to distribute their property are entitled to privacy—
the public cannot obtain information concerning the amount of
money held in the estate, the method of distribution, or the recipients
of the funds.121 When Bing Crosby died, for example, the public was
unable to obtain information about his estate because Crosby had
placed it in a revocable trust.122 Similarly, Marlon Brando used a trust
to keep his distribution scheme private.123 Privacy is one of the most
compelling reasons to have a revocable trust instead of a will.124
A trust’s privacy, however, is not absolute. If a beneficiary
challenges the trust or brings suit against the trustee, a trust
instrument may become part of a public record.125 Some states even
require a trust instrument to be recorded or otherwise available.126
Third parties may require copies of a trust instrument as a
precondition to investing or dealing with trust assets.127 In general,
however, “[t]he vast majority of Revocable Living Trusts go through
no scrutiny by any individual or organization which would invade the
privacy of the estate or the beneficiaries.”128 Thus, succession law
does provide a method to protect the privacy of a decedent’s estate
through the use of a revocable trust. But if a trust is not created,
intestacy or will proceedings become a matter of public record.
The terms of a will may reveal private information, but the
personal property distributed under the terms of a will or intestacy
statutes may reveal even more private information about a decedent.
Once an estate asserts control over a decedent’s belongings, the estate
owns any information revealed through the content of those
120. See TURNER, supra note 105, § 64:7.4; DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at
42.
121. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1013 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (stating that trust
certification “is designed to protect the privacy of a trust instrument by discouraging
requests from persons other than beneficiaries for complete copies of the instrument” and
that privacy is compromised if the trust instrument must be disclosed to the public).
122. Foster, supra note 119, at 558 n.17.
123. Id. at 563–64.
124. Id. at 565–66 (“[M]any see privacy as an essential feature of the revocable trust,
one that the legal system has gone to extraordinary efforts to preserve.”).
125. Id. at 564.
126. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-4-4(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg.
Sess.) (permitting an individual to petition the court for information concerning
beneficiaries of a trust with a showing of reasonable need).
127. JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND
TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 555 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that “the trustee may have to
provide copies of the trust document to financial institutions that invest trust assets”).
128. TURNER, supra note 105, § 64:7.4.
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belongings.129 A decedent’s documents, diaries, letters, and secrets are
left behind for survivors to find and disseminate if they choose.
Accordingly, our system of succession does not protect privacy from
family members at death, because property dissemination usually
reveals an individual’s secrets, with a narrow exception offered to
those who create inter vivos revocable trusts. Our system of
succession, however, allows an individual to choose who gets what
information from the devised property. Individual intent is always the
paramount concern in distributing a decedent’s property.
***
As we have seen, the common law does not recognize personal
privacy interests after death in the form of a privacy tort (i.e.,
intrusion upon solitude, public disclosure of private facts, or false
light) or defamation.130 Rather, courts hold that privacy is a personal
interest that dies with a decedent.131 Similarly, constitutional privacy
rights do not persist after death.132 In addition, federal statutory law
relies on common law principles and generally does not protect
posthumous privacy.133 Lastly, our testamentary structure does not
protect personal privacy, as wills and intestacy actions are public
record.134 Under these principles, a decedent has no personal privacy
interests in his digital assets. Internet companies may assert their
users’ privacy concerns by prohibiting inheritance, but there is
currently no sound legal basis to protect personal privacy at death.135
Yet, with the proliferation of digital assets and the immense amount

129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
130. See supra Section I.A.
131. Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (listing cases);
Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (listing cases).
132. See supra Section I.B; see also Swickard v. Wayne Cty. Med. Exam’r, 475 N.W.2d
304, 312 (Mich. 1991) (finding that the privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment is
personal and cannot be asserted by a decedent’s estate).
133. An argument can be made that the SCA protects posthumous privacy because it
does not specifically mention death and prohibits Internet companies from disclosing the
contents of an account without consent. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(3), (b)(3) (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 114-114, approved Dec. 28, 2015). Although Internet companies
have argued that they are prevented from disclosing digital assets after an account holder’s
death, the SCA has not been used to prosecute disclosure of digital assets to an estate
after death. See Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in
Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 841 n.260
(2014).
134. See supra notes 103–06; supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135. See Banta, supra note 133, at 816–18, 837–38.
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of information stored in these accounts, we should reconsider
posthumous privacy interests in a digital world.
II. PERSONAL DIGITAL ASSET PRIVACY AFTER DEATH
Digital assets raise new concerns and questions about privacy
after death that the common law has, so far, failed to address. The
fate of email and social networking accounts is especially important to
consider, as these digital accounts contain more personal
information—such as writings, thoughts, and pictures—than ever
before. There are at least three ways digital accounts could be treated
after death. First, these accounts could be deleted at the account
holder’s death to preserve individual privacy. Such deletion could
occur at the request of the decedent’s executor or under the terms of
the service agreement between a deceased account holder and an
Internet company.136 Second, the family of a decedent could claim
ownership of the digital “property” held in these accounts and
demand access to the accounts under the principles of succession
law.137 Third, if accounts are not deleted, there may be a point when
they are released to the public in the service of history—long after the
account holders have died.138 Each scenario poses significant risks to
posthumous privacy, testamentary intent, and historical preservation.
Of these three treatments, the only ways to truly protect personal
digital asset privacy after death are through our succession law,
additional public legislation, or the terms of a private contract. This
Part analyzes the ways personal digital asset privacy can be ensured
after death and argues that succession principles should be followed
to empower individual account holders to make testamentary privacy
decisions about the posthumous treatment of their digital accounts.
Private contracts with blanket provisions about account termination
at death are inadequate; instead, default rules about termination of
digital asset accounts after death should be legislatively determined.

136. See, e.g., Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo
/utos/en-us/ (last updated Mar. 16, 2012) [http://perma.cc/TKK5-R3VF] (“No Right of
Survivorship and Non-Transferability. You agree that your Yahoo account is nontransferable and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate
upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your account may be
terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.” (emphasis added)).
137. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 606, 609 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
138. Think for a moment what it would be like to have access to the email account of
John F. Kennedy, soldiers fighting in World War I and World War II, or Elvis Presley.
Americans are creating an unparalleled historical treasure trove through their creation of
digital assets and regular Internet use.
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A. Honoring Testamentary Intent
Succession law aims to protect a decedent’s testamentary intent,
so long as that intent does not violate public policy.139 If a decedent
makes it clear that she would like her digital assets destroyed, the law
of wills requires courts and beneficiaries to honor her clear intent. If a
decedent does not make her intent known, intestacy laws require that
assets descend to the decedent’s survivors.140 The law honors
testamentary intent by (1) allowing an individual to determine how
her body (something that is not a property interest) is treated after
death and (2) requiring executors to fulfill fiduciary duties
implementing a will. Both examples show that traditional succession
law protects a decedent’s privacy interests and could be used to
ensure that a decedent’s wishes regarding her digital assets are
honored.
1. Human Dignity and Decency Support Posthumous Privacy
The principles of modern succession law are geared towards
maintaining human dignity, a goal that would be furthered by
honoring an individual’s last wishes about his privacy. For example,
modern succession law protects a decedent’s privacy in a limited way
by honoring a decedent’s wishes about his bodily remains.141 Yet this
was not always the case. Under the English common law, neither a
decedent nor his estate had a property right in his corpse, and,
therefore, a decedent had no power to direct the disposition of his
remains by testamentary instrument.142 Instead, burial was in the
exclusive power and jurisdiction of the church.143 In America,
however, beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
testators began to claim the right to control the manner in which their
bodies were buried.144 This practice derived from Roman law, which
gave an individual power to direct his burial.145 Eventually, the
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
140. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
141. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 507–08.
142. See In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (Sur. Ct. 1938); In re Riegle’s Estate,
32 N.Y.S. 168, 171 (Sur. Ct. 1894); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904).
143. In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
144. Id.; see also Thompson v. Deeds, 61 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1895) (“[T]he duty of
courts [is] to see to it that the expressed wish of one, as to his final resting place, shall, so
far as it is possible, be carried out.”).
145. In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 89. (“Thus we find in the Roman law express
recognition of the right of a deceased by testament to direct his burial and to nominate the
person to take charge of it. The testament of this deceased, therefore, follows a pattern of
the ancient Roman law.”); John H. Corwin, Burial Law, 39 ALB. L.J. 196, 197 (1889)
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majority of courts held that a testator could direct how his body
should be disposed of via testamentary instrument.146
Courts will enforce a decedent’s wishes regarding the treatment
of her remains even over objections from her family.147 For example,
where a decedent had stated his desire for his body to be cremated,
but his next of kin opposed the cremation, the court found that the
testamentary wishes of the decedent were “paramount to all other
considerations” and, thus, enforced the cremation.148 A more recent
example occurred in Iowa, where a decedent made it known to a
company that he wished the company to cryopreserve his head.149 The
decedent’s family disregarded his wishes and buried his remains.150
The court ordered disinterment of the decedent’s body according to
his testamentary instructions.151 Similarly, testamentary intent for an
individual’s reproductive material is also enforced under the law. In
Speranza v. Repro Lab Inc.,152 a decedent’s parents sought to use the
decedent’s stored sperm to impregnate a surrogate mother.153 The
decedent, however, had given instructions to the sperm bank that he
wished his sperm to be destroyed at his death.154 Ultimately, the court

(“The ancient Greeks and Romans were particular to carry out the directions of the
deceased respecting the disposition of his body. . . . The law of New York more than
follows these unwritten and ancient customs and the law of Solon . . . .”).
146. In re Henderson’s Estate, 57 P.2d 212, 215 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (collecting
cases); In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 87 (quoting GEORGE W. THOMPSON, THE
LAW OF WILLS 640 (2d ed. 1936) (“[T]he weight of authority in this country holds that a
testator has a right to direct the manner in which his body shall be disposed of after death,
and his directions in this respect generally have been given effect.”)); Wood v. E. R.
Butterworth & Sons, 118 P. 212, 214 (Wash. 1911) (“[T]he wishes of the deceased person,
if ascertained, should be given controlling force . . . .”). There are also actions at law that
protect a corpse from being disturbed or mutilated. See Palmquist v. Standard Accident
Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 358, 360 (S.D. Cal. 1933) (mutilation); Brown Funeral Homes & Ins.
Co. v. Baughn, 148 So. 154, 156 (Ala. 1933) (improper preparation for burial); Bessemer
Land & Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 18 So. 565, 565 (Ala. 1895) (disturbance of burial
site).
147. Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Mem’l Chapel, 606 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967–68 (Sup.
Ct. 1993).
148. Id.; see also Kasmer v. Limner, 697 So. 2d 220, 220–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding testator’s desire to cremate his body in the face of his family’s objections based
on “reasons of conscience”).
149. Alcor Life Extension Found. v. Richardson, 785 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa Ct. App.
2010).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 732.
152. 875 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
153. Id. at 451.
154. Id.
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enforced the decedent’s testamentary intent and refused to allow his
parents to obtain their son’s sperm.155
Interestingly, modern courts allow a decedent to exercise power
over her corpse without dislodging the common law notion that there
is no property interest in a corpse.156 This is especially striking given
that the right to devise, which allows decedents to pass their property
on to beneficiaries, is a property interest. The justification for such
freedom of disposition is based on the recognition that an individual’s
property interest in a thing allows an individual to control the
distribution of that thing after death.157 Because a decedent has no
property interest in her corpse, this justification cannot be the basis
for protecting her right to dispose of her corpse according to her own
intent and gives rise to several implications. One implication of failing
to recognize a property right in a corpse is that courts retain power to
limit testamentary control over bodily remains and ensure that
dispositions are “done within the limits of reason and decency as
related to the accepted customs of mankind.”158 Another implication
is that courts must recognize some other kind of interest to justify
allowing a decedent’s desires to control her bodily remains. As one
court put it, “the burial of the dead is a subject which interests the
feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters of
actual property.”159
It seems as though the courts imply that a personal interest in
disposing of one’s own property mirrors a person’s privacy interests
after death—not quite property but nonetheless invoking the
protections of property. Some sort of “quasi-property” interest allows

155. Id. at 454.
156. In re Henderson’s Estate, 57 P.2d 212, 214 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (finding
elements of a proprietary interest, but not a full property interest, in a dead body); In re
Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 87–88 (Sur. Ct. 1938) (“In New York it has been stated
that there is no property in a corpse. . . . [N]o action can be maintained by the
executor . . . upon the theory of any property right . . . in a decedent’s body . . . .”
(quotations omitted)).
157. See In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) (“[A] person has some
interest in his body, and the organs thereof, of such a nature that he should be able to
make a disposition thereof . . . .”); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 1–2
(introducing freedom of disposition).
158. In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d at 110. Testamentary control over bodily remains
“should [not] be regarded as an absolute property right by which a person could give
absurd or preposterous directions that would require extravagant waste of useful property
or resources, or be offensive to the normal sensibilities of society in respect for the dead.”
Id.
159. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237–38 (1872).
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courts to enforce a testator’s wishes concerning his body.160 When
courts honor the wishes of an individual with respect to his bodily
remains, courts do not protect a property interest per se, but rather
the individual’s personal interest in maintaining his dignity even after
death.161 In this way, an individual’s interest in controlling his bodily
remains is akin to a privacy interest. Although protecting the privacy
of digital assets is not the same as honoring an individual’s last wishes
regarding burial, the principle that succession law protects interests
beyond property rights (disposition of a corpse) after an individual’s
death can be extended to the proposition that an individual’s wishes
regarding privacy of digital assets should be given greater weight,
whether or not the digital assets are seen as a property interest.
2. Fiduciary Duties Support Posthumous Privacy
The second way traditional succession law can protect
posthumous privacy is through the fiduciary duties it imposes on
executors to carry out a decedent’s intent. If the law were to treat
digital assets like tangible assets, accounts would be released to a
decedent’s estate. It would then be incumbent upon executors and
beneficiaries to protect the decedent’s privacy interests. Although a
decedent has no enforceable claim to protect a privacy interest after
death, succession law enforces a decedent’s testamentary intent. If a
decedent has made her intention for the posthumous treatment of her
digital assets known, families and courts must honor those wishes as a
matter of succession law.
Courts go to great lengths to protect the control a decedent has
over his property,162 enforcing a decedent’s testamentary intent for
160. See, e.g., Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934),
superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 27, 1934, ch. 66, 1934 Tex. Gen. Laws 146, 157–58.
161. Thompson v. Deeds, 61 N.W. 842, 843 (Iowa 1895) (“In one view, it is true it may
not matter much where we rest after we are dead; and yet there has always existed, in
every person, a feeling that leads him to wish that after his death his body shall repose
beside those he loved in life. Call it sentiment, yet it is a sentiment and belief which the
living should know will be respected after they are gone.”); Burnett, 67 S.W.2d at 1041
(“Public policy and due regard for the public health, as well as the universal sense of
propriety, require that dead bodies of human beings be decently cared for and disposed of
at the very earliest moment . . . .”).
162. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thompson, No. 1-948 / 11-0940, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS
116, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. February 15, 2012) (holding that proceeds of life insurance
should go to second wife per a premarital agreement, against wishes of the executor);
Rostanzo v. Rostanzo, 900 N.E.2d 101, 117 (Mass. Ct. App. 2009) (denying widow’s
attempts to invalidate decedent’s prenuptial agreement); Malek v. Patten, 678 P.2d 201,
206 (Mont. 1984) (holding that certificates of deposit and assets within a checking account
were meant to be a gift by decedent, despite the fact that the cotenant did not sign nor
have a key to the safety deposit box where the certificates were held).
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the distribution of his tangible and intangible goods even if such
distribution appears unfair, bizarre, or distasteful.163 The American
law of succession honors the testamentary intent of a decedent so
long as that intent is not contrary to public policy.164 To the extent we
view online accounts as property, we must view the information in
such accounts as belonging to the estate and therefore distribute that
information according to the intent of the testator.165 For example, an
individual may leave an executor instructions concerning property
containing secrets that he wants destroyed. In the digital asset world,
a provision in a will would direct an executor to terminate and ensure
deletion of all online accounts in the testator’s name. Such
instructions would protect an individual’s privacy as well as take steps
to avoid identity theft or fraud.166 In fact, this logic has led many
estate planners to encourage their clients to include provisions
concerning their digital assets.167
Instructions from a decedent to her executor to destroy or delete
her digital accounts may be the only sure way to protect personal

163. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 904–06 (Ill. 2009) (holding that a
provision of a will considering grandchild to be deceased for marrying outside of the
Jewish faith did not violate public policy); Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 228, 235
(Mass. 1955) (holding that a beneficiary lost rights to a will based on the condition that no
child marry into the Hebrew faith where the beneficiary converted to Judaism after
marriage); U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 872 (Or. 1954) (en
banc) (allowing condition that beneficiary neither adopt nor marry someone of the
Catholic faith by the age of thirty-two).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
165. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 3–4 (2009) (“When people die, everything they think
they own . . . everything will pass on to somebody or something else.”). As we will see, the
law has been favorable to families’ commercial interests in a decedent through the right of
publicity and copyright protections. See infra Section III.B.
166. See John Conner, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s
Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 301, 321 (2011)
(discussing the threat of posthumous identity theft). A 2012 study revealed that thieves
used the identities of 2.5 million deceased Americans to engage in fraudulent activities.
Susan Johnston Taylor, 5 Prime Target Groups for Identity Thieves, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Jan. 13, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles
/2015/01/13/5-prime-target-groups-for-identity-thieves [http://perma.cc/NHS6-P57U].
167. See, e.g., Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, When You Pass On, Don’t Leave the
Passwords Behind: Planning for Digital Assets, 26 PROB. & PROP. 40, 41 (2012); Joseph M.
Mentreck, Estate Planning in a Digital World, 19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 195, 198 (2009); Nicole
Schneider, Social Media Wills—Protecting Digital Assets, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, June 2013, at
16, 16; Nancy Anderson, You Just Locked Out Your Executor and Made Your Estate
Planning a Monumental Hassle, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/financialfinesse/2012/10/18/you-just-locked-out-your-executor-and-made-your-estateplanning-a-monumental-hassle/ [http://perma.cc/RUA3-E9G9 (staff uploaded archive)].
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privacy after death.168 Executors are bound by fiduciary duties to
carry out the intent of a testator.169 We trust that executors will carry
out the wishes of a decedent, although we realize that sometimes an
executor does not or may not implement the testator’s intention. An
executor can be persuaded to take another action, or a court could
decide that the testator’s intention as stated in her testamentary
instrument violates public policy. For example, in Eyerman v.
Mercantile Trust Co.,170 a testator directed her executor to destroy her
home and sell the land on which it was located, transferring the
proceeds of the sale to the residue of her estate.171 Neighboring
property owners challenged the will as contrary to public policy.172
The destruction of the house would have caused the destruction of
property worth nearly $40,000 in a neighborhood of “high
architectural significance.”173 The court frustrated the testator’s intent
by refusing to enforce her will, holding that “[a] well-ordered society
cannot tolerate waste and destruction of resources when such acts
directly affect important interests of other members of that
society.”174 In a similar case, another court noted that “[t]here is a
greater need for the protection of the community interests after the
death of the testator,” implying that the interests of the living took
priority over the desires of the dead when those desires were arbitrary
and capricious.175 If, however, a testator gives a rational reason for her
desire to have her house destroyed after her death, courts have
sometimes been more willing to uphold the will.176
In the privacy realm, an executor would be bound by fiduciary
duties to follow a decedent’s instructions to ensure that digital assets
were deleted and not passed on to a decedent’s survivors.177 However,
due to a practical enforcement problem, it is unclear whether a
168. The importance of deleting or terminating accounts has been recognized by
Nevada, which has authorized by law the ability of a personal representative not to access
but to delete certain digital accounts of a decedent. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143.188
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. Sess.).
169. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators § 342 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
170. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
171. Id. at 211.
172. Id. at 211–12.
173. Id. at 213.
174. Id. at 217.
175. In re Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
176. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Sur. Ct. 1998) (finding that a
testator’s instructions to destroy her house were done in good faith and negotiated with
the city); Nat’l City Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl. 1976) (finding instructions to destroy a house so it would not be used for commercial
purposes were not repugnant or capricious).
177. See 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators § 342 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
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testator’s stated desire for destruction would actually be carried out if
an executor refused to abide by his fiduciary duties and the
beneficiaries of an estate agreed with an executor’s action. Of course,
if an executor failed to follow a decedent’s intent and the
beneficiaries did not approve, the beneficiaries could bring a suit to
compel the executor to implement the decedent’s wishes.178 If
beneficiaries of an estate agree with the executor’s action, however,
there is no plaintiff available to bring suit against the executor for
failing to carry out a testator’s intention.179 Only those who have a
“direct, immediate, and legally ascertained” interest in a decedent’s
estate have standing to challenge a will or an executor’s actions.180
There are several examples where famous individuals wished
their papers to be destroyed at death, but their survivors defied those
instructions despite being bound by fiduciary duties. Franz Kafka, for
example, left instructions to his friend and lawyer, Max Brod, to burn
everything Kafka left behind—letters, diaries, manuscripts, sketches,
etc.181 Brod refused to burn Kafka’s unpublished work and instead
prepared a posthumous publication of Kafka’s manuscripts.182 Kafka’s
fame as a literary giant of the twentieth century was a result of Brod’s
decision to retain and publish the manuscripts Kafka himself wanted
burned.183 Kafka’s estate never sued Brod for violating the author’s
last wishes.184 Similarly, Vladimir Nabokov requested that his last

178. See, e.g., Clark v. Greenhalge, 582 N.E.2d 949, 950, 951 (Mass. 1991) (holding that
the executor must turn over a painting to the beneficiary, after beneficiary brought suit).
179. In re Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“A contestant to
the validity of a will does not have standing to do so unless he can prove he would be
entitled to participate in the decedent’s estate if the will before the court is ruled
invalid.”).
180. York v. Nunley, 610 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a person
who could challenge a will is “[a]ny person who has such a direct, immediate and legally
ascertained pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be
impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the will”
(quoting Bloor v. Platt, 84 N.E. 604, 605 (Ohio 1908))).
181. Arval A. Morris, Law, Language, and Ethics, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1342, 1344
(1973) (reviewing WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE,
AND ETHICS (Foundation Press 1972)).
182. Elif Batuman, Kafka’s Last Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/09/26/magazine/26kafka-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ACW53KVD].
183. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 15.
184. Two-thirds of Kafka’s actual letters and manuscripts ended up in Oxford’s
Bodleian Library. Batuman, supra note 182. Brod retained the remaining letters and
manuscripts and passed them on to Esther Hoffe, who in turn bequeathed them to her
daughters. Id. The National Library of Israel challenged the legal validity of Hoffe’s will.
Id. A Tel Aviv judge ruled in favor of the National Library in 2012, and the library said it
would publish the documents. Alison Flood, Huge Franz Kafka Archive to Be Made
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novel be destroyed if he died while writing it—which he did—but his
son published the novel in 2009 despite his request.185 Ernest
Hemingway also requested that his letters not be published, but his
wife ultimately published 600 of them after his death.186 These actions
were all presumptive breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the
decedent, yet no one with standing challenged the preservation of
these writings. Society may have benefited from the preservation of
leading literary figures’ previously unpublished works, and the
authors’ estates may have benefited from increased profit. The loss,
however, is that the authors’ testamentary intent and privacy were
ignored. If an individual with standing were to challenge an executor’s
decision to not destroy manuscripts or letters according to the intent
of a decedent, a court would likely uphold the executor’s action
because such action would be in accordance with protecting
testamentary intent.
Of course, if a decedent is of such public stature that her
personal materials would carry historical significance, the societal
value of preservation and disclosure could override personal privacy.
Some well-known public figures have recognized the danger that a
court might so find, leading them to ensure that their personal
materials were destroyed during their lives. For example, Justice
Black destroyed the bulk of his Supreme Court conference notes as
soon as he became ill.187 Similarly, Martha Washington realized the
immense historical value of her letters to her husband, George
Washington, and to prevent their being made public after her death,
destroyed them before she died.188
Thus, the law provides a mechanism for an individual to keep his
information private after death by stating his intention in a legally
executed will and relying on an executor to follow his wishes.
Applying succession principles will ensure that courts honor
decedents’ intent concerning their digital assets just as courts honor
decedents’ intent concerning physical distribution of their assets.
Where a formally executed will states a desire to destroy or delete
Public, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/oct/15/franzkafka-archive-public [http://perma.cc/8M96-AKNW].
185. Elizabeth Barber, Franz Kafka: Should We Have Never Known Him?, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (July 3, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/2013/0703/FranzKafka-Should-we-have-never-known-him [http://perma.cc/2WBR-U4RW].
186. Id.
187. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 14.
188. See JAMES WALTER, MEMORIALS OF WASHINGTON AND OF MARY, HIS
MOTHER, AND MARTHA, HIS WIFE 228–29 (1997); ROBERT P. WATSON, AFFAIRS OF
STATE: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL LOVE, SEX, AND SCANDAL 82 (2012).
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online accounts, that desire must be protected. As we have seen, “the
organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is
freedom of disposition,” and the law generally implements this
principle by ensuring that “the donor’s intention is given effect to the
maximum extent allowed by law.”189 A fundamental principle of
succession law is that a court will implement a testator’s intent even if
that intent is unreasonable or unfair.190 An individual may not have
privacy interests under the common law, but an individual does have
testamentary interests protected by fiduciary principles. Accordingly,
executors should be compelled to follow an individual’s testamentary
intent to delete digital assets at death and thereby protect digital
privacy as a matter of testamentary law.
B.

Using Private Contracts

Although the common law does not protect personal privacy
from disclosure to a decedent’s next of kin, and testamentary intent
regarding privacy has not been applied to digital assets, digital assets
have another potential layer of protection because they are formed by
private contracts. Contracts may allow or require an account to be
deleted after a decedent’s death, thereby preserving personal privacy
and prohibiting disclosure to an account holder’s estate.191
The treatment of digital assets after death is largely decided by
companies’ online terms of service agreements.192 The evolution of
law in this area is in its nascent form. Because the common law
affords virtually no protections to privacy after death for an
individual, private contracts may be the best way to ensure that digital
accounts are deleted after death rather than distributed to the
decedent’s family.

189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
190. See id. (“American law does not grant courts any general authority to question the
wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or
her property.”).
191. See, e.g., Contacting Twitter About a Deceased User or Media Concerning a
Deceased Family Member, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/33-report-aviolation/topics/148-policy-information/articles/87894-how-to-contact-twitter-about-adeceased-user [http://perma.cc/9SF6-TKH2] (noting that Twitter will delete the account of
a deceased person, but will not give access to said account regardless of the requester’s
relationship to the deceased); see also Dropbox Terms of Service, DROPBOX, https://www
.dropbox.com/terms [http://perma.cc/4QJ8-RVJC] (noting that inactive accounts are
automatically deleted ninety days after the last login); YAHOO!, supra note 136 (noting
that accounts may be deleted after an account holder’s death).
192. See, e.g., sources listed supra note 191.
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There are three main concerns, however, with digital asset
private contracts as they currently exist: (1) they do not allow an
individual to choose the level of privacy that should be accorded;193
(2) they do not ensure the deletion of an account (with all the private
information an account holds) at death;194 and (3) they dramatically
alter succession law by crafting a default rule without legislative
input.195 Private contracts can be successful in protecting posthumous
privacy if they work within the principles of succession law,
implement testamentary intent, and include legislatively sanctioned
default rules.
Given the previously discussed failures of common law and
testamentary structure to adequately protect posthumous privacy,196
private contracts may be the only means of protecting privacy after
death. We may assume that many people have some correspondence,
pictures, or other personal information in their digital asset accounts
that they would prefer to be destroyed after death instead of
transferred to surviving relatives. It is also likely that some would
want their digital assets to be passed on to their surviving relatives
after they have died.197 Terms of service agreements, as a default, do
not take individual intent into account in their blanket clauses that
terminate digital accounts upon the account holder’s death. Yet, as a
third party providing a service online, digital asset companies are well
positioned to effectuate individual intent as manifested in the contract
between user and company.198 The third-party service provider could
simply include in the contract an opportunity for an individual to
choose how she would want her account to be treated upon her death.
Google, for example, has pioneered this kind of contractual
agreement with its Inactive Account Manager, addressing the need of
its users to have a voice in what happens to their accounts when they
die.199 The third-party service provider would then be bound by
contract either to delete private information after death or transmit
the information to the estate. Furthermore, the third-party service

193. See infra notes 196–203 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 229–33 and accompanying text.
196. See supra Part I.
197. One of the gaping holes in discussions about digital assets after death is the
complete lack of reliable, empirical evidence about how the majority of Americans would
like their digital assets to be treated postmortem.
198. For concerns about the additional cost this might impose on digital asset
companies, see Banta, supra note 133, at 835–37.
199. About Inactive Account Manager, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts
/answer/3036546?hl=en [http://perma.cc/GM4T-6C6S].
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provider would have no commercial interest in exploiting the contents
of an account,200 and thus might be more faithful and neutral in
carrying out the wishes of the deceased than a beneficiary.
Consider the situation that arises when companies refuse to
allow a decedent’s estate access to his online account,201 or if no
family member petitions the company for access to the account. Some
companies’ default policy for managing a decedent’s account is to
terminate an inactive account regardless of testamentary intent or the
desires of an estate.202 These companies justify their refusal to allow
an estate access by citing concerns about their users’ privacy.203 These
blanket deletion policies protect a decedent’s privacy where the law
does not. Thus, private contracts can give stronger privacy interests
and rights than the common law or statutory law, but they ignore
succession principles and testamentary intent. Whether such contracts
can be enforced is another question taken up in the next Section.
At first blush, companies’ concern with the privacy interests of
their users seems reasonable and socially responsible. Legal concerns
may also motivate them, as some industries have been compelled by
federal law to establish privacy policies regarding personal
information.204 But privacy measures by many companies have been
200. Any commercial interest in the contents of the account would descend to the
decedent’s survivors. See infra Section III.B.
201. See infra notes 298–300.
202. See YAHOO!, supra note 136.
203. Options Available When a Yahoo Account Owner Passes Away, YAHOO!,
http://help.yahoo.com/kb/index?locale=en_US&page=content&id=SLN9112 [http://perma
.cc/QU5X-U6NC] (stating that “[t]o protect the privacy of your loved one, it is our policy
to honor the initial agreement that they made with us, even in the event of their passing,”
meaning Yahoo! “cannot provide passwords or allow access to the deceased’s account,
including content such as email. At the time of registration, all account holders agree to
the Yahoo Terms (TOS). Pursuant to the Terms, neither the Yahoo account nor any of the
content therein are transferable, even when the account owner is deceased”); see also
Report a Deceased Person, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/408583372511972/
[https://perma.cc/46J9-KYCU] (“Please keep in mind that we cannot provide login
information for someone else’s account, even after [his death]. It’s always against
Facebook’s policies to log into another person’s account.”); Submit a Request Regarding a
Deceased User’s Account, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/2842525
?hl=en&ref_topic=3075532 [https://perma.cc/KA7A-3Q6U] (“Users have a strong and
reasonable expectation of privacy and security when using Google’s products . . . even in
the event of their death.” However, “in certain circumstances we may provide content
from a deceased user’s account. In all of these cases, our primary responsibility is to keep
our users’ information secure, safe, and private. . . . Any decision to satisfy a request about
a deceased user will be made only after a careful review.”).
204. See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) of 1998, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501–6502 (2012) (instituting online child identity protection policies); Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012) (regarding the financial services
industry); Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012) (requiring privacy
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largely voluntary.205 Companies often use their privacy policies as a
marketing tool to show consumers that they are careful with the
personal information stored on their websites.206 Sometimes, however,
the privacy policies of a company are more for show than to protect
substantive privacy—policies may disclose how personal data are
collected, while also allowing the company to transfer those data
freely.207 Policies that do so lack any real commitment to safeguarding
personal privacy during life or after death.
Companies also may take different positions on user privacy
depending on what is at stake. For example, Google espouses a
commitment to personal user privacy after death208 but in litigation
has stated that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in emails.209 On the other hand, when a service provider states in a
contract that it will not release the contents of an account due to
privacy concerns, we assume that companies delete a decedent’s
inactive account.210 As with all contracts, however, slight nuances in
policies for telecommunications entities); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (regarding the privacy of individual health
information).
205. Mary J. Hildebrand & Jacqueline Klosek, Recent Security Breaches Highlight the
Important Role of Data Security in Privacy Compliance Programs, INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J., May 2005, at 20, 20 (“[M]any entities, even those that are not under any legal
obligation to do so, have been developing and posting Web site privacy policies.”); James
P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making Strategies and the
Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 1 (stating
that in unregulated industries, “disclosing information practices is largely voluntary”).
206. Nehf, supra note 205, at 1 (“Market pressures encourage many businesses to at
least appear sensitive to customers’ privacy concerns.”).
207. See, e.g., David Goldman, Your Phone Company Is Selling Your Personal Data,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 1, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/01/technology
/verizon_att_sprint_tmobile_privacy/ [http://perma.cc/B8PS-9D4Q] (“Your phone company
knows where you live, what websites you visit, what apps you download, what videos you
like to watch, and even where you are. Now, some have begun selling that valuable
information to the highest bidder. . . . Verizon is the first mobile provider to publicly confirm
that it is actually selling information gleaned from its customers directly to businesses.”).
208. See GOOGLE, supra note 203.
209. Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual and
Class Action Complaint: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 28,
In Re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 5:13-md-02430-LHK (N.D. Cal. 2013). See generally
Jessica Guynn, Google Must Face Suit over Scanning of Messages in Gmail, Judge Rules,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/26/business/la-fi-tn-googlegmail-scanning-lawsuit-judge-ruling-20130926 [http://perma.cc/JFU5-KEV7] (describing a
lawsuit filed over Google’s use of Gmail contents for advertising purposes).
210. Of course, it is possible that the companies do not actually delete the account and its
contents, thereby assuring that the account information could be revealed at a future date.
See Jacqui Shine, You Can Delete, but You Can’t Forget, ATLANTIC (July 3, 2014)
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/you-can-delete-but-you-cant-forget
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language matter. Yahoo! has a policy that an account holder’s rights
to an account terminate “upon your death” and “may
be . . . permanently deleted.”211 Lacking in this language is a promise
that the account will be deleted. When pushed by a probate court to
release the contents of an account of a deceased user to the user’s
father several months after the account holder was killed, Yahoo! still
had the contents of the account and obliged without appealing.212 The
account had not been deleted.213 The lack of assurance from service
providers that an account will be deleted at the death of an account
holder compromises the personal privacy that can be obtained by
private contracts.
Furthermore, even though a company has contracted with a
deceased individual that the contents of his account will not be
transferred at death, there may still be no way to enforce terms of the
private contract after death. It is unclear whether a cause of action
would lie against a company that released the information to an estate
in violation of the terms of the contract.214 Surely, if an estate were
petitioning for access to an account, they would not protest the
breach of contract between a company and the deceased. Moreover,
mere concerned citizens would lack standing to challenge the release
of information by the company to a decedent’s family.215
/373662/ [http://perma.cc/KBF9-PPEP] (explaining that once an email is deleted, it is still on
a commercial server for a period of time).
211. See YAHOO!, supra note 136 (emphasis added).
212. Order to Produce Information, In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob.
Ct. Apr. 20, 2005) (ordering Yahoo! to give all contents of Justin Ellsworth’s account to the
personal representative of his estate); Paul Sancya, Yahoo Will Give Family Slain Marine’s
E-mail Account, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2005, 11:32 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday
.com/tech/news/2005-04-21-marine-email_x.htm?POE=TECISVA
[http://perma.cc/5R9ELV7M]. See generally Justin’s Family Fights Yahoo over Access to His E-Mail Account,
http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/yahoofight.htm [http://perma.cc/L5V3-8PT6] (collecting
news articles about the dispute between Yahoo! and the Ellsworth family).
213. See Jacqui Goddard, Bereaved Father Fights Yahoo for Dead Son’s War E-mails,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2005), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica
/1480797/Bereaved-father-fights-Yahoo-for-dead-sons-war-e-mails.html [http://perma.cc
/V7FY-BSQ6] (noting that the decedent’s father was attempting to gain access to his
deceased son’s email account prior to its deletion).
214. If the contractual right is seen as a personal right, it dies with the person. See
Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Iowa 550, 553 (1867) (discussing the common law maxim “actio
personalis moritur cum persona,” that a personal action dies with the person and property
rights survive).
215. See York v. Nunley, 610 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a
person who could challenge a will is “[a]ny person who has such a direct, immediate and
legally ascertained pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator’s estate as would be
impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or be benefited by setting aside the
will . . . .” (quoting Bloor v. Platt, 84 N.E. 604, 605 (Ohio 1908))); In re Estate of Luongo,
823 A.2d 942, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“A contestant to the validity of a will does not
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Of course, a company may face market pressure if it fails to meet
contractual obligations to keep information private after death.
Perhaps users would be less likely to use a certain email account or
social networking platform if they knew they could not trust the
provider to keep it secure during their life and after their death.
The Yahoo! probate case discussed above provides a strong
example. When the father of the decedent sought access to his son’s
account after his son had been killed in Iraq, public pressure mounted
against Yahoo!.216 The father sued Yahoo! and a probate court
ordered the company to give the father access to his son’s e-mail,
despite terms in the service agreement that allowed termination of
the account at death.217 To appease the public and the court, Yahoo!
acquiesced, and did not appeal the decision based on the terms of the
contract with the decedent.218 The terms of the agreement, however,
were not individually negotiated or agreed to by the decedent.219 He
had assented to the terms of the agreement through his use of Yahoo!
as an email provider, but he had never expressed any testamentary
intent regarding the treatment of his account after death.220 If Yahoo!
had allowed some way for him to indicate that he desired Yahoo! to
destroy his email account upon his death or provided some other
document that expressly showed his desire that his account remain
private, it is more likely that the court would have upheld the terms of
the contract.221
Federal law offers a set of unique potential enforcement
mechanisms for contract law. If a company tries to renege on an
agreement to terminate an account at the holder’s death and instead
releases account contents to the public, that company may face
liability under copyright or federal privacy law. Under copyright laws,
a decedent’s family could obtain statutory damages if the release of
documents, correspondence, or photos has infringed on an estate’s
copyright.222 Moreover, the SCA,223 discussed earlier,224 prevents the
have standing to do so unless he can prove he would be entitled to participate in the
decedent’s estate if the will before the court is ruled invalid.”).
216. Order to Produce Information, supra note 212; Sancya, supra note 212.
217. Sancya, supra note 212.
218. Id.
219. See YAHOO!, supra note 136.
220. Id.; see also Banta, supra note 133, at 822–23 (discussing the failures of private
contracts to address testamentary intent).
221. See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing cases that upheld contractual terms in sperm
donor and corpse treatment contracts that specifically demonstrated testamentary intent).
222. See infra Section III.B.2. Statutory damages are set out in 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
223. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114, approved Dec. 28,
2015).
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disclosure of such information to the public without lawful consent.225
Presumably, consent could be granted by a decedent’s survivor, but
consent clearly could not be granted by the decedent herself. Thus, if
a company released the contents of an account without the consent of
either the decedent, in life, or the decedent’s estate, it could be
prosecuted under the Act.
Contractual protections may conflict with common law
protections and an estate’s claims of ownership of publicity or
copyright over the decedent’s unpublished digital assets. If digital
accounts are not deleted or do not pass to a decedent’s estate,
Internet companies could claim ownership of the information and
release the contents of an account to the public. The public may be
especially active in demanding a release if these accounts include
information of public interest. For example, if the information relates
to a celebrity scandal or a moment of national importance, the
Internet company and the public may be more willing to allow the
digital accounts to be released even in breach of contractual terms. To
date, no Internet company has been prosecuted under the SCA for
releasing the contents of a deceased account holder to family
members,226 but perhaps there would be more concern about Internet
companies publicly releasing information of deceased users.
Even assuming that Internet privacy policies are intended to
substantively protect the account holder’s privacy after death and will
be upheld after the account holder’s death, a second conceptual
problem with these policies arises—such policies are created
unilaterally by companies with no input or direction from an account
holder.227 In effect, companies impose privacy after death through
contractual terms no matter what a decedent would have chosen.228
This unilateral imposition of terms governing the posthumous
disposition of digital assets contradicts the principles of succession
law, which first attempt to implement a decedent’s testamentary
intent and only then rely on state intestacy defaults to fill in gaps.229 If
a decedent has not made his intent known, intestacy statutes control

224. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
225. § 2702(a), 2702(b)(3).
226. An exhaustive search of cases under 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) revealed no such
prosecution for releasing content to a family member.
227. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 191.
228. See, e.g., YAHOO!, supra note 136 (“Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate,
your account may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.”).
229. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103, -105 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2008); see
also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 64–65.
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distribution of his property.230 Intestacy statutes are based on the
individual decedent’s presumed intent.231 Private contracts controlling
digital assets (unlike intestacy statutes) do not necessarily presume
the intent of an account holder. Instead, these contracts dictate terms
of an agreement that favor a company’s business goals and directives,
not necessarily the best interests of society as a whole. Companies
assume that contractual terms will be applied universally without
regard to individual testamentary intent once an individual begins to
use an online service. Because private contracts now control
succession principles that have traditionally been regulated by state
legislatures, private contracts have the power and ability to
fundamentally shift succession norms and property interests in digital
assets.232
In sum, in the context of private contracts, individuals lack any
ability to opt into or out of the default rules set by the companies, and
the end users also lack an opportunity to choose how stringent they
would like privacy protections to be for digital assets in the event of
an untimely death. In sum, private contracts between user and
company dictate all the terms of privacy after death and allow little to
no input or comment from an account holder. This kind of private
ordering is not the most reasoned and appropriate way to reform
privacy rights after death.
A default rule of deletion or preservation is the best way to
ensure that people make a conscious choice about how their digital
assets will be handled after death. In many ways, the debate about
posthumous privacy comes down to one issue—if a decedent has not
made known her intent about the privacy of her digital accounts,
should the default rule be set by the terms of the contract or by a state
legislature? Currently, in the majority of states, the default rule is set
by contracts with a minimal required showing of the account holder’s
assent to a company’s unilaterally established contractual terms.233
230. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 12, at 63–65.
231. Id.
232. For a fuller discussion of this trend, see generally Banta, supra note 133.
233. Only eight states have enacted legislation to allow an estate to receive or delete
digital assets of a decedent notwithstanding the terms of service agreements. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess. & June Spec.
Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch. 194, 2016);
IDAHO CODE § 15-3-715(28) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. & First Extraordinary Sess.);
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-13-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 143.188 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. Sess.); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3
(LEXIS through chs. 1 & 2, Jan. 2016 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2012 & Supp.
2015).
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The default rules depend on the policies of each company, which can
be changed at any time. If we are to reshape posthumous privacy
rights in a digital future, the conversation about how far those rights
should extend needs to occur in a public forum, not in terms of
service agreements posted online that most people do not read. It is
troubling in a democratic society that private companies currently
make the default rule rather than state legislatures. In a democratic
society, default rules that affect our privacy interests should be
established by elected state legislatures, not by corporations with
disproportionate bargaining power. State legislatures should pass
intestacy laws that enforce decedents’ presumed intent and allow for
opting out of intestacy defaults.
A few states have resisted online service providers’ unilateral
control over digital asset succession and have enacted laws addressing
the treatment of digital assets after death, but none of these laws
explicitly address decedents’ privacy interests in their online
accounts.234 Instead, these laws grant access to a decedent’s digital
assets to his estate, placing the burden of protecting privacy on the
estate.235 Digital asset succession laws in these states have not yet
been challenged.236
Private contracts have not taken the lead in effectuating
individual choice for how accounts should be treated at death, and
legislation is needed to protect consumers’ interest in devising or
destroying their digital accounts. Outside the digital privacy frontier,
a similar phenomenon has occurred in other industries where there is
an unusual need for individualized protection for consumers. When
legislatures find practices problematic, unjust, or fraudulent, they
often enact mandatory rules that override private contracts. In
landlord-tenant agreements, for example, courts and legislatures
impose the warranty of habitability and forbid parties to contract for
sub-standard housing.237 Similarly, courts and legislatures require a

234. See sources cited supra note 233.
235. As we have seen, an estate does not have an obligation to protect a deceased
member’s privacy absent an express statement in a testamentary instrument, and, even
then, an executor could violate her fiduciary duties to a decedent with the consent of the
beneficiaries with little fear of being held accountable for a breach. See supra Section
II.A.2.
236. No cases are reported that challenge any of the laws cited supra note 233.
237. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-503 (LEXIS through 2015 First Reg. Sess.);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4457(a) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); Landis & Landis Const., LLC v. Nation,
286 P.3d 979, 983 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that a rodent infestation is an actionable
breach of the warranty of habitability).
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landlord to follow specific eviction procedures and prohibit the
landlord from unilaterally setting the terms of eviction.238 Antidiscrimination laws also limit the freedom of contract in landlordtenant relationships and aim to prevent a landlord from
discriminating against potential tenants.239 In consumer law, rules of
misrepresentation or deceit ensure that parties cannot supply faulty
information to a consumer.240 Disclosure laws protect consumers from
entering into unfair agreements.241
Privacy protection after death is another area where legislation
could accomplish a great deal. In the first place, legislatures should be
responsible for creating the default rules of what should happen to
digital accounts when an account holder dies. Through the democratic
system, legislatures can engage in principled reform and create laws
that both protect privacy concerns in information-heavy digital
accounts and preserve individual testamentary intent. As a potential
first step, legislatures could pass disclosure laws ensuring that users
know how their accounts will be treated at death. Legislation could
also mandate that companies give individuals a contractual choice
about how their assets should be treated at death. Namely, individuals
could choose either to have their accounts deleted at death or to
release their accounts to their estates. If an individual chose to
maintain her privacy by having her account deleted after death, her
decision should override a family member’s desire to obtain access to
the account. The third-party’s refusal to grant access would be based
on the decedent’s clearly expressed intent to maintain her personal
privacy in the account, even after death. Laws that require an
affirmative choice for how assets will be treated at death would
protect individual privacy and testamentary intent.
238. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-17-902 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. & First Extraordinary
Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.21 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. & Spec. A Sess.);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 4701 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Sess. & Spec. A Sess.);
Hous. Auth. of the City of New Haven v. Martin, 898 A.2d 245, 248 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006); Corpus Christi Hous. Auth. v. Lara, 267 S.W.3d 222, 225–26 (Tex. App. 2008).
239. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(6)–(8), (11) (West, Westlaw
through ch. 164 of 2015 1st Ann. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(g)–(h) (West, Westlaw
through L.2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H) (LEXIS through Legis. Passed by
131st Gen. Assemb. and filed with Sec’y of St. through file 45 (SB 223) (excluding file 32
(HB 56), file 34 (HB 124), file 38 (HB 237), file 39 (HB 259), file 40 (HB 340), and file 41
(SB10))).
240. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-626 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 13-301 (LEXIS through 2015 Legis. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b)(21) (West,
Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
241. See ALA. CODE § 8-25-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg., First Spec. & Second
Spec. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-8-5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.).
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Private contracts, despite their noted shortcomings, should play a
role in protecting privacy after death. The common law is ill suited to
the task at hand because it does not recognize an interest in privacy
after death. Private contracts and legislative action can fill a gap left
by the common law by granting users more choice and control over
privacy after death. Google, for example, has created a method for
users to affirmatively determine who should have access to an
account when it becomes “inactive.”242 Through Google’s Inactive
Account Manager, a user may choose whether he prefers his account
to remain private and be terminated at death or transferred to his
survivors.243 Facebook has also recently allowed individual choice to
dictate the fate of the personal information stored in an account.244
Such avenues for expressing intent accommodate digital privacy
interests after death and promote the fundamental principles of both
contract and succession law. If digital asset contracts were to include a
legislatively mandated choice between succession and destruction,
such contracts would effectively balance the difficulties of protecting
privacy and enforcing testamentary intent.
Any legislation should also account for the fact that information
may remain on companies’ servers for many years after an account
holder’s death. Such digital archives may be a source of our history
fifty or a hundred years from now. Posthumous privacy has a shelf
life. At some point, no reasonable claim of privacy can be made.
Recently, three-hundred-year-old letters were found unopened and
undelivered in the Netherlands.245 These letters were written by
members of all social classes and in a variety of languages.246
Academics are eagerly examining them as they provide a unique
glimpse into late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century Europe.247
No reasonable claim of privacy can be made to prohibit the study of
these letters because it has been too long after the deaths of those
who wrote them. Legislatures should pass laws to create digital
242. GOOGLE, supra note 199.
243. Id.
244. See What Is a Legacy Contact?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help
/1568013990080948 [http://perma.cc/74MR-AK5U]. Facebook allows a decedent to choose
an individual who can update a profile picture, respond to friend requests, and write a post
on a profile once a decedent’s account becomes memorialized. Id.
245. These letters are over 300 years old, and no one is concerned about the private
information contained therein because they are now a part of history. Maev Kennedy,
Undelivered Letters Shed Light on 17th Century Society, GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2015, 10:36 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/08/undelivered-letters-17th-century-dutchsociety?CMP=fb_gu [http://perma.cc/C9CC-R24W].
246. Id.
247. Id.
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archives with information that remains sealed until the legislature
deems that privacy protection is no longer needed. Because digital
accounts will hold many historical treasures of our generation, it may
be in the public interest to allow some sort of public dissemination.
Such dissemination should only be permitted, however, after any
privacy interest in those data has dissipated with the passage of time.
By sealing these assets for a period of time after an individual’s death,
the legislature can balance the need for dissemination and historical
preservation with privacy protections.
***
As we have seen in this Section, posthumous privacy must be
reshaped to adapt to the digital age. This can be achieved by allowing
traditional succession principles to apply to digital assets. These
principles ensure that an individual account holder’s testamentary
decisions about her privacy will be honored after her death.
Contractual terms can help support testamentary intent regarding
posthumous privacy, but any contractual term that forbids transfer
after death or presumes the intent of a user without legislative
guidance should be invalid. It is the province of state legislatures to
craft default rules regarding the assumptions of testamentary intent of
digital asset accounts after death, and private contracts are not
sufficiently equipped to fill that void. A decedent’s family can also
protect privacy interests by following traditional succession principles,
which will be discussed in the next Part.
III. DIGITAL ASSET INTESTACY: PRIVACY IN A FAMILY PARADIGM
Surviving family members should control the disposition of a
decedent’s digital information where the decedent has not made his
desires known and no specific legislation exists. Although
posthumous privacy is generally not protected under the common
law, constitutional law, statutory provisions, or our testamentary
structure,248 these systems and laws all point to the principle that
surviving family members should have a claim in controlling
posthumous privacy interests in a digital future. Legislation should be
adopted that applies traditional succession principles to digital asset
privacy, and in the absence of specific testamentary intent, a family
should have access to a decedent’s digital accounts.

248. See supra Part I.
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There are several justifications for this: first, inheritance has long
been locked in a family paradigm. Property passes to an individual’s
family if she has made no other arrangements.249 Privacy, too, should
be protected or managed by the decedent’s living family members if
she has made no other arrangements. Second, although the decedent
herself may not have enforceable personal privacy interests, the
common law affords limited protections to privacy after death based
on concerns about familial privacy and human dignity.250 For instance,
the common law is likely to protect distressing or disturbing images
and information held in a digital asset account from public exposure
based on a family’s interest in protecting that information.251 The law
also protects privacy in the hands of a survivor’s family to the extent
that information about a decedent can be seen as a commercialized
property interest.252 These limited protections based on succession
principles, family privacy, and commercial interests suggest that
families should have a claim in controlling the privacy interests of a
decedent’s digital assets if an individual has not elected to have her
accounts terminated upon her death. A default rule should rely on a
decedent’s heirs to protect a decedent’s account information from
public disclosure, not from disclosure to a decedent’s family.
Honoring a decedent’s testamentary wishes concerning privacy and
allowing families to protect the privacy of digital assets after death if
no intent is known will maintain testamentary devises in their family
paradigm.
A. Familial Privacy and Inheritance
Allowing a family access to digital accounts and holding family
members responsible for protecting the privacy interests of a
decedent accords with practice and tradition. If a decedent has not
249. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103, -105 (2008).
250. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628,
631 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting the familial privacy interest in audio recordings of astronauts
immediately before the Challenger explosion); N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep’t,
829 N.E.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. 2005) (“The desire to preserve the dignity of human existence
even when life has passed is the sort of interest to which legal protection is given under the
name of privacy.”); Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895) (“It is the right of
privacy of the living which is sought to enforce here. That right may in some bases be itself
violated by interfering with the character or memory of a deceased relative . . . .”); Reid v.
Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (holding that surviving family members have a
privacy interest in the autopsy records of a decedent).
251. See supra Section I.B.
252. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2012) (providing that copyright protection is transferrable
through testamentary instrument or intestate succession); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2015 ed.) (publicity).
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made his intent known, intestacy laws divide a decedent’s estate and
transfer it to the decedent’s surviving family members.253 Family
members are usually those who must sort through the tangible
possessions that may reveal an individual’s secrets. Families also have
the privilege to protect information they discover or already knew
from public dissemination. Expanding such protections and privileges
from tangible possessions into the digital realm, states have begun to
enact legislation protecting the ability of a family to access a
decedent’s online accounts.254 While these statutes do not address
personal privacy protections, they do treat digital assets as if they
belong to a decedent’s survivors.255 Although tort law does not protect
an individual’s privacy after death,256 it favors a family-centered
paradigm to control private information about a decedent. Even if the
digital accounts or the information contained within them are not
seen as “property” or descendible to a decedent’s surviving family
members, the information, images, or words in those accounts could
receive protection under a limited common law exception that
recognizes and protects family privacy. Although this exception has
never been formally recognized or named, courts have protected
family members’ privacy regarding information about or pictures of
deceased family members. For purposes of this Article, I use the term
“familial privacy exception” to describe the phenomenon of courts
protecting family members’ privacy concerning the death of a
relative. This Section argues that this line of court decisions both in
traditional tort law and in interpreting public record dissemination
exceptions could be applied to protect digital assets of the deceased
from public dissemination.
The familial privacy exception discourages others from revealing
information about a decedent if such information would harm
surviving family members.257 Tort law has protected a family’s interest
253. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to -103, -105 (2008).
254. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-334a (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
& June Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws, ch.
194, 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. & First
Extraordinary Sess.); IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg.
Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 269 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); 33 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (LEXIS through chs. 1 & 2, Jan. 2016 Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2110 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
255. See sources cited supra note 254.
256. See supra Part I.
257. See, e.g., Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“[Some
courts] support the view that under certain circumstances the deceased's relatives may
recover for the invasion of their own privacy interests even though they were not
personally the focus of the publicity in question. The rationale behind these decisions is
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in keeping disturbing or difficult images from the public based on a
sense of familial privacy. To recover for a breach, family members
must show that an image’s publication or disclosure is an invasion of
their privacy interest, which will often require egregious facts and a
high threshold of proof.258 Courts protect the invasion of privacy of a
decedent’s death-scene images or last recorded moments not on the
basis of protecting posthumous privacy, but on the theory that a
decedent’s survivors have a right to privacy separate from the right of
a decedent.259 Accordingly, if the living family members’ privacy
rights were also infringed by dissemination of the decedent’s private
information, those family members can recover.260 In fact, this tort has
begun to expand beyond its common law roots; a relational right of
privacy to the relatives of a deceased has been codified in a number of
states.261
If family members can only claim that they are relatives of the
wronged victim and were “unwillingly brought into the limelight”
because of the published information about a decedent, they will be
unable to recover under an invasion of privacy claim.262 The tort
demands a discrete harm to the family members’ privacy, such as
additional grief caused by publication of emotionally taxing deathscene photos.263 Mere supplemental notoriety is not enough. For
example, in Flynn v. Higham,264 the court rejected the family’s claim

that the relatives of the deceased have their own privacy interest in protecting their rights
in the character and memory of the deceased as well as the right to recover for their own
humiliation and wounded feelings caused by the publication.”); Bazemore v. Savannah
Hosp., 155 S.E. 194, 197 (Ga. 1930) (holding that parents of a deceased child could recover
for invasion of privacy when a hospital published a picture of the malformed child as part
of an advertisement).
258. Loft, 408 So. 2d at 624 (“When there are unusual circumstances . . . it may be that
a defendant's conduct towards a decedent will be found to be sufficiently egregious to give
rise to an independent cause of action in favor of members of decedent's immediate
family.”).
259. Bazemore, 155 S.E. at 197 (Ga. 1930) (“In this case the child was dead when the
unauthorized acts were committed, and the right of action could not be in the child, but in
the parents.”).
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. A
Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-205 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 839.1 (West, Westlaw through First 2015 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-9-406 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216.1
(2014 & Supp. 2015).
262. Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975).
263. See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 358 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010); Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 341–42 (Wash. 1998).
264. 197 Cal. Rptr. 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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of invasion of privacy when a book claimed that their father had been
a homosexual and a Nazi spy because family members were never
mentioned in the challenged publication—they could only claim an
invasion of their father’s privacy, which did not survive his death.265
Courts use several policy justifications to support a familial
exception in tort privacy law and to prevent dissemination of public
records based on concerns about family privacy. These justifications
include allowing a family to protect private information after death,
protecting human dignity, protecting intensely personal moments,
protecting a family from emotional pain, and protecting the
decedent’s character and memory. These justifications also support
allowing families to control private information in digital accounts
after the account holder’s death in situations where the decedent has
not made her intent known.
In situations involving the disclosure of public records such as
autopsy photographs, death scene images, photos of a corpse, or
recordings of a decedent’s last words taped by emergency callers,
courts often look to tort privacy principles in allowing the family to
bring an invasion of privacy claim to control the dissemination of
those materials.266 Courts have been especially sympathetic to the
claims of family members to control the dissemination of photos of
the dead or the last recorded moments of a person’s life.267 The
Supreme Court recently held that FOIA recognized “surviving family
members’ right to personal privacy with respect to their close
relative’s death-scene images.”268

265. Id. at 146–47.
266. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004) (death
scene images); Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 358 (images of decapitated accident victim);
Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 849–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912) (images of dead, deformed
infants); Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. KC 03-207, 03-2697, 2004
WL 1770102, at *3 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2004) (taped emergency calls); Reid, 961 P.2d at
335 (autopsy photographs).
267. Katz v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 482–83, 485–86
(D.D.C. 1994) (protecting autopsy photographs of President Kennedy because they were
not “agency records” subject to FOIA and stating that even if they were agency records,
they would be exempt from disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of privacy). Of course,
death image pictures are not always protected. In Fitch v. Voit, 624 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1993),
a newspaper published a picture of a woman lying in bed at a hospital and described that
she was dying of cancer. Id. at 543. The court found that any privacy interests had died
with the decedent and the family did not have a relational right of privacy in the picture.
Id. Similarly, in Savala v. Freedom Communications, Inc., No. F048090, 2006 WL 1738169
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006), a newspaper published a picture of a man who had been shot in a
public park, but when the family sued, the court did not recognize the family’s right of
privacy in the victim’s death image. Savala, 2006 WL 1738169 at *1, *8.
268. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
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Several other cases concerning death images arise from
government officials using the images as a form of personal
entertainment. In Reid v. Pierce County,269 for example, medical
examiner’s office employees allegedly kept a scrapbook of autopsy
photographs of corpses that they would show at cocktail parties.270
The county argued that if any privacy interest was violated by this
collection of photographs, it was the interest of the deceased and not
the relatives of the deceased.271 The court rejected that argument,
holding that the relatives of the deceased, but not the deceased
themselves, had a protectable privacy interest in autopsy records.272
More recently, in Catsouras v. Department of California Highway
Patrol,273 highway patrol officers took pictures of a woman who was
decapitated in a car accident and emailed these photographs to
friends and family.274 These pictures quickly spread on the Internet.275
The court found that the pictures were disseminated “out of sheer
morbidity or gossip”276 and sustained the family members’ “common
law privacy right in the death images of a decedent.”277
In protecting emergency calls made by victims in a nightclub fire,
a court characterized the calls as “intensely personal” and explained
that they were “entitled to protection . . . to avoid a highly intrusive
interference with the legitimate privacy entitlement these individuals
should be afforded.”278 The victims’ families were not involved in
these personal phone calls.279 Yet, the court extended the decedents’
privacy interest to the families because of the intimate nature of the
calls.280 The court suggested that both the victims and their family
members had a privacy interest in the calls, even though the victims
died in the tragedy.281
Similarly, in the case that determined whether NASA’s
Challenger audiotapes would be released, the court found that the
sound of the astronauts’ voices was an “intimate detail” that the
269. 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998).
270. Id. at 335.
271. Id. at 339, 341–42.
272. Id. at 342.
273. 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
274. Id. at 358.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 366.
277. Id. at 358.
278. Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. KC 03-207, 03-2697, 2004
WL 1770102 at *3 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2004).
279. Id. at *1.
280. Id. at *3.
281. Id.
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families had a right to protect, despite the fact that the families had
no involvement in creating the audio recordings.282 The court
explained that releasing the voice recordings would only add to the
survivors’ anguish.283 A court also refused to grant journalists access
to audiotapes of emergency calls made by victims in the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the basis that the surviving relatives had
an interest in keeping the calls private.284 In these cases, the nature of
the personal information compelled the courts to extend decedents’
privacy to their families to protect these intimately personal moments
from public scrutiny. In effect, the court protected a decedent’s
privacy interests through his family.
Courts also justify familial privacy with concerns about
protecting human dignity, thus blurring the distinction between a
decedent’s privacy interest and her family’s privacy interest. By
“preserv[ing] the dignity of human existence . . . when life has
passed,”285 courts protect the privacy interest of decedents as much or
more than families’ privacy interests in preserving the dignity of
another. In this way, we honor the deceased by not disseminating the
pictures of his death or the audio recordings of his final moments. A
similar protection may be warranted for the last pictures posted or
emails sent via a decedent’s online accounts, regardless of the
underlying circumstances.
Courts have justified familial privacy by pointing to familial
rights in the “character and memory of the deceased”286 or in
“honoring and mourning their dead.”287 In Schuyler v. Curtis,288 family
members sued to enjoin an organization from building a statue of
their deceased family member. The court ruled in favor of the family,
holding that “[a] privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for
the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings, and to prevent a
violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the

282. N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. 628, 631
(D.D.C. 1991). Although the case arose in the context of the government asserting the
family’s privacy interest instead of the family itself, the legal principles at play should
remain constant even within the context of a family asserting the same interest for
themselves. If anything, that the government here asserted the claim on behalf of the
family indicates that the identified principles should apply more broadly.
283. Id.
284. N.Y. Times Co. v. City of N.Y. Fire Dep’t., 829 N.E.2d 266, 269 (N.Y. 2005).
285. Id.
286. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895).
287. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
288. Schuyler, 42 N.E. at 25.
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deceased.”289 Thus, for a deceased family member to receive privacy
protections, those bringing suit must be able to allege an intrusion of
their own privacy.290 Curtis is not alone in relying on this
justification—other courts similarly argue that this interest is to
protect the feelings of the living, not to protect the feelings of the
dead.291 In doing so, however, courts implicitly allow families to
protect the privacy interests of the dead and control information
about a decedent’s death that would cast a shadow over the character
and memory of the deceased.
Lastly, courts conflate a decedent’s privacy interests with those
of family members by emphasizing the pain family members may feel
when the decedent’s private moments are disclosed. Courts have been
concerned with exposure that would cause families pain, humiliation,
or distress.292 By protecting families from the pain of public
disclosure, courts extend privacy interests beyond an individual’s
death. Courts that protect familial privacy allow family members to
control the pictures or words of the deceased in an unprecedented
way under the common law. Courts have granted this control to
families on a limited basis despite the countervailing concerns of
freedom of the press and the free flow of information.293
Looking at these cases in aggregate reveals that courts give
several justifications for the right of familial privacy. These include
preserving the human dignity of a decedent,294 protecting a decedent’s

289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849, 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912) (finding that
two parents had a protectable privacy interest in a picture of their deceased twin boys,
who had a connected sternum, due to suffering and humiliation that the photographer
inflicted upon the parents by disseminating the picture).
292. See, e.g., Katz v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 862 F. Supp. 476, 485 (D.D.C.
1994) (pointing to the fact that the Kennedy family has been traumatized by prior
publication of autopsy records); N.Y. Times Co. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782
F. Supp. 628, 631 (D.D.C. 1991); Douglas, 149 S.W. at 849 (finding that exposure of
photographs had “humiliated” the family and “their feelings and sensibilities had been
wounded”).
293. See, e.g., Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. at 632–33; see also
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”); Barry P. McDonald, The First
Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 250–54 (2004) (describing the
historical development of First Amendment jurisprudence with regard to a right to the
free flow of information).
294. Reid v. Pierce Cty., 961 P.2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) (“We hold the immediate
relatives of a decedent have a protectable privacy interest in the autopsy records of the
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“intensely personal” moments,295 protecting a family’s right in the
character and memory of the deceased,296 and protecting the family
from emotional pain.297 Each blurs the line between a decedent’s
privacy interest and that of the family, and can be logically extended
to apply to digital asset privacy after death. By taking into
consideration the intimate details that often accompany an unsightly
death, courts shield the privacy of a decedent’s death from public
scrutiny. In doing so, a decedent’s right of privacy to intimate
moments are still protected through her family members.
Tort law demonstrates that courts are sympathetic to surviving
family members’ desire to protect private information about
decedents. Surely the intimate details, pictures, and voice recordings
kept on third-party Internet sites should be entitled to a similar level
of protection. Families would be responsible for ensuring that the
material and information stored on the Internet, these “intensely
personal moments,” were protected from public scrutiny through the
rights of surviving family members. Because digital assets are more
pervasive and capture the most detailed, intimate portrayals of our
lives, the tort-created exception for posthumous privacy interests
should extend to digital asset privacy as well. Currently, Internet
companies control the fate of an account after death without input
from the account user or his family. In most cases, however, it would
better serve principles of succession law for surviving family members
to control digital asset accounts.
If an individual has not made her desires known concerning her
digital accounts, a family member’s desire to know more about the
decedent’s life should override a third-party contract’s terms of
deletion. A family member’s desire to know why a decedent
committed suicide,298 to understand more about the circumstances of
a decedent’s suspicious death,299 or to obtain closure from the
decedent. That protectable privacy interest is grounded in maintaining the dignity of the
dead.”).
295. Providence Journal Co. v. Town of W. Warwick, No. KC 03-207, 03-2697, 2004
WL 1770102, at *3 (R.I. Sup. Ct. July 22, 2004).
296. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1895).
297. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 782 F. Supp. at 631 (“Exposure to the voice of
a beloved family member immediately prior to that family member’s death is what would
cause the Challenger families pain.”).
298. See Fredrick Kunkle, Virginia Family, Seeking Clues to Son’s Suicide, Wants
Easier Access to Facebook, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost
.com/2013-02-17/local/37149666_1_facebook-page-facebook-spokesman-andrew-noyesprivacy-laws [http://perma.cc/B9RV-EAVH].
299. See In re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and
Things, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting Facebook’s motion to quash
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unexpected death of a loved one300 are interests that should take
precedence over the interests of a third-party company that stores this
information. Public policy favors disclosure of factual circumstances
regarding an individual’s death to family members.
Social networking sites, personal webpages, and blogs are
beginning to serve as virtual memorial sites to deceased individuals as
family and friends mourn publicly on a digital forum.301 Family
members usually wish to control the content of such platforms when
they are used for the purpose of remembering a deceased loved
one.302 For example, a man recently posted a picture of himself
holding a gun to his mouth before taking his own life.303 Facebook
refused to give the family access to the man’s account, but eventually
removed the disturbing photo from his profile.304 If Facebook had
refused to do so, it might have been subject to a privacy tort brought
by his family alleging harms to the character of the deceased and the
family’s memory of him.305
In sum, the same justifications that promote familial control of
death images and recordings may be used to protect digital asset
privacy interests of a decedent from public disclosure. In addition, the
common law tort exception for familial privacy interests demonstrates
that the law favors giving family members control over information
about the decedent. Both the common law exception and
testamentary construction of a decedent’s privacy interests after
death suggest that a decedent’s survivors are best suited to ensure the
posthumous privacy of digital accounts.
B.

Commercialization of Privacy

As we have seen, the law should protect a family’s testamentary
right to a decedent’s digital accounts and favor familial privacy
protections. The law also protects a family’s commercial interests in a
family members’ subpoena for contents of decedent’s profile after she died in apparent
suicide).
300. See, e.g., Petition to Produce Information, In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE
(Mich. Prob. Ct. Mar. 4, 2005) (requesting access to decedent’s Yahoo! account after
petitioner’s son was killed in Iraq).
301. Annie Johnson, Online Memorials Help Students, Families Cope with Loss, USA
TODAY (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/12/20/online-memorials
/4145385/ [http://perma.cc/6N5A-U5F5].
302. Steve Eder, Deaths Pose Test for Facebook, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2012, at A3.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Clay Calvert, Salvaging Privacy & Tranquility from the Wreckage: Images of
Death, Emotions of Distress & Remedies of Tort in the Age of the Internet, 2010 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 311, 313 (2010).
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decedent’s image, likeness, voice, or original works through the right
of publicity and copyright law. These doctrines do not necessarily
protect a decedent’s personal property rights in her digital assets, but
they do give the family another legal argument that the contents of
those digital accounts should descend to a decedent’s estate. These
doctrines can be used in an indirect way to allow a decedent’s family
to protect posthumous privacy. In addition, publicity and copyright
rights show that the law protects families’ interests in the intangibles
of a decedent’s personhood, fame, or creation. Since the law protects
commercial interests, there is ample room for protecting a family’s
interest in the information stored on an individual’s online accounts if
she has not made her wishes known concerning his digital asset
personal privacy.
1. Publicity
Privacy interests in digital assets can be protected through a
family’s right of publicity. The right of publicity protects an
individual’s right to exploit the commercial value of his name and
likeness.306 This right developed as an offshoot of privacy law to
prohibit the nonconsensual exploitation of people’s likenesses.307
Mental suffering and anguish caused by the nonconsensual
dissemination of an individual’s picture or likeness without consent—
the same harm recognized under the right to privacy—justified the
recognition of the right of publicity.308
Initially, courts used a privacy paradigm to consider exploitations
of people’s likenesses. For example, in 1902, a woman brought a claim
against a flour company that had circulated an advertisement using
her picture without her consent or knowledge.309 She claimed that she
had been “greatly humiliated by the scoffs and jeers” of people who
had seen the advertisement and felt that her “good name ha[d] been
attacked, causing her great distress and suffering.”310 The court
viewed this claim as based on privacy, found that New York had not
yet adopted the right of privacy, and, therefore, concluded that the
plaintiff could not use a privacy-based right to remedy the wrong.311 A
few years later, in Georgia, a court presented with similar facts came

306. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1983).
307. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 252, §§ 1:4, 1:7.
308. Id. § 1:7.
309. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 447–48.
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out the opposite way. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Co.,312 a man brought suit against a life insurance company that had
used his picture without his consent.313 The court found that the
complaint alleged an invasion of the right of privacy and should not
have been dismissed by the trial court.314
Eventually, courts recognized publicity as a separate interest
from privacy because of the distinct harms that the two were designed
to prevent: the right of publicity was designed to protect commercial
interests, while the right of privacy was intended to prevent personal
harms, such as embarrassment and emotional suffering. For example,
in 1953, a court in New York explicitly recognized the right of
publicity as separate from the right of privacy.315 The case involved a
dispute between a baseball player and two chewing gum
manufacturers that wanted to use his image to market their brands.316
One manufacturer wanted the exclusive right to the baseball player’s
photo, and the other manufacturer argued that “a man has no legal
interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of
privacy . . . a personal and non-assignable right[.]”317 The court
rejected this argument and found that an individual “has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph,”318 reasoning that the value of
marketing fame increased if it was an exclusive grant, barring others
from using the images.319
Once courts generally recognized the right of publicity during
life, they next attempted to distinguish the right of privacy from the
right of publicity, establishing the right of publicity as distinct and
independent from the right of privacy.320 These courts argued that
privacy protects a person from embarrassment as well as guarding her
dignity and peace of mind, and also recompenses a person for
emotional distress.321 The right of publicity, in contrast, protects one’s
right to the commercial value of her identity due to fame and
popularity.322 Therefore, when the right of publicity is infringed,
312. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
313. Id. at 69.
314. Id. at 81.
315. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1953).
316. Id. at 866.
317. Id. at 868.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 252, § 6:3. Over thirty states recognize a right of
publicity under the common law or by statute. See id. §§ 6:3, 6:8.
321. See Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175,
188 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
322. Id.
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courts reason, the harm is commercial rather than personal.323 As one
court described, the interest protected by the right of publicity “is
closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and
having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.”324
By separating the right of publicity from the right of privacy,
courts were able to take a fresh approach to the question of whether
the right of publicity, unlike the right of privacy, is descendible.
Courts and states are currently split on whether the right of publicity
can be enforced after an individual’s death.325 The divide usually
centers on how clearly a court has tried to distinguish the right of
publicity from the right of privacy. Some have found that the right of
publicity is not descendible because, like privacy, it is a personal
interest that ends at the death of the individual.326 In finding that the
right of publicity was not descendible, the Sixth Circuit explained,
“[f]ame falls in the same category as reputation; it is an attribute from
which others may benefit but may not own.”327 In a slight variation,
other courts have required an individual to exercise the right of
publicity during his life in order for his estate to be able to protect it
after his death.328 However, the majority of courts and legislatures
that have considered the issue have decided that the right of publicity

323. Id.; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977)
(“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the proprietary
interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”).
324. Zacchinni, 433 U.S. at 573.
325. Out of the about thirty states that recognize a right of publicity for living persons,
thirteen states recognize a right of publicity after death. Talk of the Nation, ‘Rights of
Publicity’ Extended Beyond the Grave (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 4, 2012); see also, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02 (LEXIS
through 131st Gen. Assemb. through file 45 (SB 223)); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti
Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding a right of publicity
postmortem); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 682 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding a right of publicity postmortem); Jim
Henson Prods., Inc., 867 F. Supp. at 190; Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz & Bettis, L.L.P.,
684 S.E.2d 756, 760 (S.C. 2009) (finding the right to control the use of an identity to be
descendible postmortem); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 252, § 6:8.
326. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1980)
(“[T]he right of publicity should not be given the status of a devisable right, even where as
here a person exploits the right by contract during life.”).
327. Id. at 959.
328. See, e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 490
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F.
Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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is descendible at death whether or not the individual exploited the
commercial value of his name and likeness during life.329
California, for example, protects the name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness of a deceased person for seventy years after
death, during which time consent is needed for any lawful commercial
use of the decedent’s image.330 Tennessee allows publicity rights to
descend, but only extends the protections for ten years after the
individual’s death.331 If, unlike Tennessee, a state legislature has not
specifically limited the duration of the right of publicity, the right
could extend for an unlimited duration. Oftentimes, however, the
right of publicity does not stay in the family;332 instead, corporations
purchase it.333 No matter who owns the publicity right, the right
permits control over the use of a person’s identity after death and any
profit from it.334 In fact, Forbes keeps a list each year of the top
grossing dead celebrities.335 The likes of Michael Jackson, Elvis
Presley, Charles Schulz, and Elizabeth Taylor top the list.336
Of course, it is possible for a testator to request that her family
not exploit her image after death, but the right of publicity would not
further the testator’s objective. The right of publicity protects a
family’s right to profit from exploitation, but not a decedent’s right to

329. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2741.02; Herman Miller, Inc., 270 F.3d at 326 (“The district court did not err in
recognizing a post-mortem right of publicity under Michigan common law.”); Martin
Luther King, Jr., Cent. for Soc. Change, Inc., 694 F.2d at 683 (“[A] person who avoids
exploitation during life is entitled to have his image protected against exploitation after
death just as much if not more than a person who exploited his image during life.”); Jim
Henson Prods., Inc., 867 F. Supp. at 190 (“Connecticut would interpret the right of
publicity as descendible.”); Gignilliat, 684 S.E.2d at 760 (“[T]he right to control the use of
one’s identity is a property right that is transferable, assignable, and survives the death of
the named individual.”); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 9:17 (2015 ed.).
330. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(1), (g).
331. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
332. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (acknowledging that publicity rights are
freely transferable by any testamentary instrument or by any subsequent owner).
333. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. & Spec. A Sess.)
(acknowledging that corporations can be authorized to own the publicity interest of a
deceased individual).
334. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 252, §§ 6:3, 6:7.
335. Dorothy Pomerantz, Michael Jackson Is the Top-Earning Dead Celebrity with a
$140 Million Haul, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/dorothypomerantz/2014/10/15/michael-jackson-tops-forbes-list-of-top-earning-deadcelebrities/ [http://perma.cc/F5HS-7NYF (staff-uploaded archive)].
336. Id.
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prevent it.337 Strong publicity protections therefore give rise to a
strange outcome: individuals can publish blatantly false information
about a decedent without fear of reprisal, but as soon as that
individual tries to put a decedent’s image to commercial use by
printing it on a mug, advertisement, or pamphlet, the individual could
be liable. Accordingly, publicity rights potentially emphasize the
trivial while failing to offer substantive protections for a decedent’s
reputational interests.
No matter how they are couched, publicity rights are extensions
of privacy interests in the commercial realm because they allow a
decedent’s family to control his image. The interests protected by the
right of publicity, admittedly, may not be information a decedent
would want to keep private. Rather, publicity of image, likeness, or
voice has a commercial value that is only realized through disclosure.
Yet, the core of the right of publicity, not unlike the right of privacy,
allows a family to choose which products and causes a decedent’s
image will promote. If a company published a picture in a commercial
venture that a decedent’s family did not want public, the right of
publicity could prevent its publication. For example, in Gracey v.
Maddin,338 a court found that a family had the publicity right in its
deceased family member’s name and was able to prevent the
deceased individual’s former law firm from using his name after his
death.339 In fact, publicity rights have expanded to protect more than
just a person’s name or likeness; in recent decades, they have been
found to include things such as: a game show hostess’s physical
pose,340 a professional football player’s nickname,341 frequently used
phrases of a television show host,342 a Broadway singer’s unique
singing style,343 and even the distinct details of a race car driver’s
car.344

337. Perhaps a testamentary right, protected by fiduciary duties as discussed supra
Section II.A would compel a court to enforce the intent and desires of a decedent not to
be used for commercial profit. This issue has not been litigated.
338. 769 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
339. Id. at 501.
340. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
341. See Hirsch v. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 131, 138, 140 (Wis. 1979)
(holding that a cause of action for appropriation of a person’s name for trade purposes
exists under common law in Wisconsin).
342. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 83133, 835 (6th
Cir. 1983).
343. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (“We need not and do
not go so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is
actionable. We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely

94 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2016)

984

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

Thus, in those jurisdictions where publicity rights are protected
after death, a decedent’s surviving family members could assert
control over the use of a decedent’s image, phrases, or voice. This
may be especially relevant to social networking accounts where
Internet companies receive advertising revenue based on the number
of people who view a particular site.345 If people were viewing the site
to see pictures or information about a deceased individual, a family
could assert its right of publicity and control how the third-party
server used the decedent’s image, likeness, or phrases. Of course,
asserting the right of publicity would not prevent the public from
obtaining information on publicly accessed digital asset accounts and
publishing that information. But because companies like Google,
Yahoo!, Facebook, and Twitter gain commercial advantages when
others visit their websites to view the likeness of a deceased
individual, a family’s publicity rights arguably are threatened by this
commercial use of a decedent’s online account. The right of publicity,
therefore, is another legal doctrine that favors a decedent’s family in
controlling her digital persona after death.
2. Copyright
Digital assets are a unique form of property. Whatever property
interest an individual may have in his online accounts under a private
contract, an individual always owns a copyright interest in his written
emails, photos, or other documents he authored.346 Although

known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California.”).
344. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1974).
345. See generally LON SAFKO, THE SOCIAL MEDIA BIBLE: TACTICS, TOOLS &
STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS SUCCESS (2010) (explaining how to make money by using
social media); TRACY L. TUTEN, ADVERTISING 2.0: SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETING IN A
WEB 2.0 WORLD (2008) (discussing various methods of generating revenue through social
media). Revenue also comes to the companies from selling the data obtained about a
deceased individual. See Tamlin Magee, What Happens to Your Data After You’re Dead?,
FORBES (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tamlinmagee/2013/11/19/whathappens-to-your-data-after-youre-dead/#2715e4857a0b78dba54e4f8d
[http://perma.cc
/4RKW-WP69].
346. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (providing that copyright protection subsists in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression now known or later
developed from which such works can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated). “Works of authorship” include literary works, musical works, pictorial,
and graphic works and sound recordings. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976),
as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“Authors are continually finding new ways
of expressing themselves, but it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new
expressive methods will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of
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copyright law does not aim to protect privacy,347 it could be used to
afford a family limited protection over a decedent’s digital materials
after death.
Copyrights are based in the U.S. Constitution and governed by
federal law.348 The Copyright Act defines copyrights as “an original
work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”349
Works of authorship are protected under copyright law irrespective of
whether they are published or unpublished.350 Copyrights are a form
of property interest, and the copyright holder owns title to the
material.351 In addition to this title, federal law allows the copyright
holder the exclusive rights to reproduce copyrighted work, prepare
derivative works, distribute copies, perform the work, and create
digital audio transmissions of the work.352 The copyright holder may
also prevent others from using or distorting the work.353 In addition,
the owner of a copyright may transfer her title to the copyright by
conveyance during life or through a testamentary instrument after
death.354
Copyright law does not take privacy principles into account in
determining whether or not a violation of copyright law has
occurred.355 Instead, copyright law aims to protect a commercial,
proprietary interest in artistic material in order to encourage, not
prohibit, public access.356 It does so by offering a “limited monopoly”
over the material it protects.357 Especially relevant for our purposes,
copyright does not extend to facts, so to the extent the decedent’s
digital material is factual, copyright will not be an adequate tool of

copyrightable technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside
the present congressional intent.”).
347. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he protection of privacy is
not a function of copyright law.”).
348. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1011332 (2012).
349. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
350. § 104(a).
351. § 201(a).
352. § 106.
353. § 106(A).
354. § 201(d).
355. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he protection of privacy is
not a function of copyright law.”).
356. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 56 (1961).
357. Bond, 317 F.3d at 393.
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protection.358 The following case shows the extent of copyright law’s
limitation in protecting privacy.
In Bond v. Blum,359 a case arising out of a custody dispute over
three children, a father wanted to introduce a manuscript written by
his ex-wife’s new husband (Bond) to show that their shared home was
inappropriate and, in fact, possibly dangerous.360 To prevent the
introduction of this manuscript, Bond registered his manuscript at the
copyright office and then commenced an action for copyright
infringement.361 The court, however, held that the introduction of
Bond’s manuscript into evidence was not a violation of his copyright
and that the use of the manuscript “fell within the scope of fair use
authorized by Section 107 of the Copyright Act.”362 In conducting this
analysis, the court noted that the stepfather was not trying to protect
any market use of the manuscript or claim any commercial damage.363
On the contrary, the harm the father claimed was his lost right to
control the dissemination of a private document.364 The court
maintained, as have other courts, that if the “essence” of the claim is a
desire for privacy, rather than commercial use, then the common law
of privacy must be used to protect against the dissemination because
the Copyright Act does not.365
From Bond, we see that copyright cannot be used to protect the
privacy of information in documents if there is no claim of
commercial harm. The unauthorized dissemination of the manuscript
in Bond needed to be challenged under the common law principles of
privacy, not as a violation of copyright law. But as we have seen,
common law privacy protections do not extend beyond an individual’s
358. Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488,
492 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[C]opyright protection does not extend to ideas or facts even if such
facts were discovered as the product of long and hard work.” (citation omitted)).
359. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003).
360. Id. at 390. The stepfather’s manuscript professed to be an autobiographical
account of how he had murdered his father. Id. Although unpublished, the manuscript was
discovered by the children’s father and maternal grandfather who were concerned about
the children’s safety and had begun investigating their stepfather. Id. at 390–91. Through
their investigation, the children’s father obtained the manuscript and attempted to use it in
the custody proceedings. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 397.
363. Id. at 395.
364. Id.
365. Id.; see also Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329 (M.D. Fla.
2012) (“The only evidence in the record reflecting harm to Plaintiff relates to harm
suffered by him personally and harm to his professional image due to the ‘private’ nature
of the Video’s content. This evidence does not constitute irreparable harm in the context
of copyright infringement.”).
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death, and the family’s right to protect their own privacy after a
decedent’s death is limited.366 Therefore, digital assets that may hold
noncommercial but desired information about a decedent’s life would
not be protected on either the grounds of privacy or of copyright
unless the documents, emails, or photos had some kind of commercial
value a decedent’s family wished to control by asserting the
decedent’s copyright.
Another hurdle in using copyright to protect the privacy of
digital assets is a distinct variation of the fair use defense discussed in
Bond.367 The fair use defense presumes that an unauthorized use of
copyrighted material occurred but excuses the use nonetheless, as
long as it is fairly used for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.368 For example, the fair
use defense may be used to allow publication of facts about a
decedent’s life gleaned from unpublished letters and personal
documents.369 The fair use defense, however, is not ironclad and does
not always justify copyright infringement.370 In one such case, a
memory card with photos of a celebrity wedding was found in the
celebrity couple’s car and released to a magazine.371 The couple had
kept their wedding secret, but the publication of their wedding
pictures informed their families and the public of their marriage.372
The court held that even though the “clandestine wedding was
newsworthy, newsworthiness, by itself, is insufficient to demonstrate
fair use.”373 Thus, copyright law was used to provide a remedy for the
wrong the couple suffered, and allowed the couple to prevent further

366. See supra Sections I.A, III.A; see also Justice v. Belo Broad. Corp., 472 F. Supp.
145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (collecting cases); Flynn v. Higham, 197 Cal. Rptr. 145, 149 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (collecting cases).
367. To determine whether a particular use of copyrighted material is “fair use,” courts
apply four factors provided in § 107 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Bond,
317 F.3d at 394.
368. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
369. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (concluding
that the alleged copyright infringer did not use the deceased’s unpublished letters to
“recreate [her] creative expression, but to establish facts necessary to her biography”).
370. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2012)
(finding that the fair use defense failed when private, yet newsworthy, photographs were
sold to the media).
371. Id. at 1169.
372. Id. at 1168–69.
373. Id. at 1177.

94 N.C. L. REV. 927 (2016)

988

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

publication of the private pictures.374 The privacy interests of the
couple, however, were only tangentially at play.
Because heirs continue to hold the copyright in the decedent’s
works of authorship, they are able to protect the privacy of that
information, especially when it comes to personal written documents.
The copyright of the material does not extend to the actual object
holding or embodying the copyrighted material; expression is the sole
subject of copyright protection.375 For example, an author may own a
copyright to a book, but that ownership does not extend to the
physical book itself. The book is a separate object that may be sold or
inherited, but the expressive contents—the actual writing in the
book—may not be reproduced for commercial gain because of
copyright protections. Thus, an estate has no need to claim ownership
of the digital accounts themselves to establish a protectable copyright
interest in their contents.376
A recent example demonstrates how copyright can protect
posthumous privacy many years after an individual’s death and may
be applicable to digital accounts in the future. Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis willed her copyright interests in her writings, as well as the
physical writings themselves, to her children.377 She also stated, “I
request, but do not direct, my children to respect my wish for
privacy.”378 Over a period of fifteen years during her adult life,
Onassis wrote intimate letters to an ecclesiastical leader in Ireland.
These letters reveal many personal and private reflections on her life,
her marriage to John F. Kennedy, and her grieving process after her

374. Id. at 1183–84.
375. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the
work is embodied.”).
376. Some terms of service agreements require a user to “license” their intellectual
property to the Internet company platform, but even these licenses do not eviscerate a
user’s copyright in the material. See, e.g., Facebook Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last updated Jan. 30,
2015) [http://perma.cc/E8FJ-DJUV] (“[Y]ou grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sublicensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in
connection with Facebook (IP License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP
content or your account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have
not deleted it.”). The potential conflict between terms and service license agreements and
copyrights is beyond the scope of this Article but is ripe for future discussion.
377. Matt Viser, Kennedy Letters Fiercely Protected for Decades, BOS. GLOBE (June 10,
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/06/09/with-kennedy-family-copyrightclaims-letters-from-jackie-kennedy-hold-uncertain-future/UqIpwZkgptcJvBov9e4JbI
/story.html [http://perma.cc/KCV7-L99T (dark archive)].
378. Id.
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husband’s death.379 These letters came into the possession of a college
in Ireland, which decided to auction them off in a time of financial
difficulty.380 An Irish auction house planned to sell the letters, which
were expected to fetch at least $1.3 million.381 Caroline Kennedy (the
last remaining child of Onassis) had her attorneys contact the auction
house, resulting in the auction’s cancelation.382 Although the college
owned the physical letters, Caroline Kennedy owned the copyright to
their expressive content. The threat of legal action from the copyright
owner protected the letters from being publicly sold and
disseminated, at least until such time that the copyright expires.383
Copyrights to works of authorship exist for only a limited period
of time after the copyright owner’s death, but during this limited time
surviving family members can use copyright to protect a decedent’s
private correspondence from being commercially exploited or
disseminated. Emails and social networking posts have the potential
to be exploited after a decedent’s death, especially if a decedent was a
celebrity or public figure. Because copyright interests descend to a
decedent’s surviving family members, families are best suited to
control whether information about their loved one is disseminated or
protected when it is embodied in a decedent’s work of authorship.
***
If a decedent has not left an indication of how she wants private
information stored in her digital accounts to be treated at death,
family members should have the ability to control or access that
information as a practical matter because they are responsible for
ensuring that the decedent’s affairs are tied up after her death. Family
members should also have a claim over digital assets to protect the
intensely personal and intimate details of a family member’s life that
379. Id.; see also Tricia Escobedo, Jackie Kennedy Letters Withdrawn from Auction,
CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/23/politics/jackie-kennedy-letters-auction-canceled/
(last updated Sept. 19, 2014, 6:39 PM) [http:// perma.cc/H8HW-DED3].
380. Diana Reese, Jacqueline Kennedy’s Letters to Irish Priest Pulled from Auction
amid Controversy, WASH. POST (June 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/shethe-people/wp/2014/06/03/jacqueline-kennedys-letters-to-irish-priest-pulled-from-auctionamid-controversy/ [http://perma.cc/V5E8-583C].
381. Michael Kelly, Jackie Kennedy Letters to Irish Priest Withdrawn from Planned
Auction, CATH. NEWS SERV. (May 22, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.catholicnews.com
/services/englishnews/2014/jackie-kennedy-letters-to-irish-priest-withdrawn-from-plannedauction.cfm [http://perma.cc/9DV3-FATJ].
382. Reese, supra note 380.
383. Id. Copyright protection extends for a limited period of time. Seventy years after
Onassis’s death, the copyright in her letters will expire and the letters will be admitted into
the public domain. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
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can be found in digital accounts. In addition, through copyright
protections and publicity rights, family members can ensure that
service providers do not profit from a deceased individual’s
information, images, or works of authorship held on their servers. In
accessing and closing a loved one’s digital accounts, family members
will best be able to honor and mourn the dead.
CONCLUSION
Courts have long held that the dead have no privacy interests to
protect and that privacy interests therefore do not survive death. Yet,
with the advent of digital assets and the immense amount of personal
and private information collected and stored on third-party servers, it
is incumbent upon state legislatures, courts, and the public to
reconsider the efficacy of a posthumous right of privacy. This Article
has argued that the current approach to digital asset privacy after
death—namely allowing corporations to dictate the terms of
posthumous privacy in private contracts—is inadequate because these
contracts do not allow individual choice or testamentary intent to
control the use of personal information after death.
A multifaceted approach is therefore necessary. Private contracts
are a laudable, if imperfect, tool for protecting personal privacy in a
manner consistent with individual choice. To better align posthumous
privacy interests with the needs of a digital future, the law must
ensure that succession principles honoring testamentary intent apply
to privacy as well as property rights. Following succession principles
empowers individual account holders to make testamentary privacy
decisions about their digital accounts and helps ensure that a
decedent’s individual intent concerning the fate of digital asset
accounts is honored. Finally, if a decedent has not made her intent for
her digital assets known, the default rule should be crafted by state
legislatures, not private companies, and should be in accordance with
present law, which allows surviving family members to control
information about and commercial interests of a deceased individual
and to protect a decedent’s posthumous privacy interests. Legal
privacy protections were born out of technological advancements, and
as technology continues to advance, so too must privacy interests.

